Deliberate often � decide once (Latin Proverb)
When anger rises, think of the consequences. (Confucius)
What was hard to endure is sweet to recall. (French Proverb)
A lean agreement is better than a fat lawsuit. (German Proverb)
Don�t live in a town where there are no doctors. (Jewish Proverb)
Peace hath her victories, no less renowned than War. (John Milton)
You can�t force anyone to love you or lend you money. (Jewish Proverb)
You can�t wake a person who is pretending to be asleep. (Navajo Proverb)
He that takes medicine and neglects diet, wastes the skills of the physician. (Chinese Proverb)
Promises are like the full moon; if they are not kept at once they diminish day by day. (German Proverb)
In matters of style, swim with the current; in matters of principle, stand like a rock. (Thomas Jefferson)
When the eyes say one thing and the tongue another, the practiced person relies on the language of the first. (Ralph Waldo Emerson)

Continued from Part I

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t a point, Gowon and Ojukwu had to rein in their personal hatred for each other in order to find a solution to the problems that were threatening to break up Nigeria into pieces; because by then Awolowo had also threatened that if the Igbos are allowed to opt out of Nigeria, that he will take the Yorubas also on secession course. The western nations also needed/still need Nigeria intact as Britain left it because of the oil and the chain reactions the breaking away of the eastern region of Nigeria would have unleashed on the whole continent. Because, the majority of nations in the continent just gained their independence within that period and based on the fragility of those nations as regards to how they came to be. Because, the Nigerian experiment where people of different tribes, religions, cultures and social backgrounds were lumped together as a nation was also repeated in many of the other African countries that already had their independence. So allowing Biafra to break away would have served as a rallying point for secession to so many other ethnic groups in different countries in Africa.

On August 9 1966, a meeting of representatives of the Military Governors of the East, Mid-West, West, North and Lt. Col. Gowon met and unanimously reached agreement on five issues which were vital for reducing the tension then existing in the country. The first demonstration of bad faith on the part of Lt. Col. Gowon was his non-implementation of a number of these agreements which concerned him, particularly the one stipulating that soldiers should be repatriated to their Regions of origin and confined to barracks. Lt. Col. Gowon had also agreed with the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria that soldiers returning to the North from the East and vice versa should carry their arms and some quantity of ammunition for self-defence but that these arms and ammunition should be returned to their original armoury immediately the soldiers had reached their destination. Eastern soldiers returning from the North were not even given arms and ammunition for self-protection as stipulated. Furthermore, when Northern soldiers arrived at their destination they failed to return the arms and ammunition given to them in the East.

Another agreement reached on August 9, 1966, was that a conference of Regional delegations should be held to recommend in broad outline the future form of political association for Nigeria. The Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference duly met from 12th September to October 3, 1966 when it adjourned for three weeks. By the time it rose it had reached a measure of agreement on a number of issues. But while the Conference was still in session, Northern soldiers with the aid of civilians massacred thousands of Eastern Nigerians in the North and some even in Lagos, the venue of the Conference.

As the date of resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference approached the question of the safety of Eastern delegates came to the fore. The Eastern Nigeria Military Government insisted on the immediate implementation of the agreement of 9th August whereby all military personnel were to be posted to barracks within their respective Regions of origin. The Eastern position was unanimously supported by the Leaders of Thought Conference of Western Nigeria. But the proposal was not acceptable to Lt. Col. Gowon, and without further consultations with all the Military Governors he dismissed the Constitutional Conference on November 30, 1966. At the same time he declared that he was appointing a "drafting committee" to draw up a constitution which would be suitable to him, and threatened to mobilize enough forces to deal with anyone who opposed his will.

The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria thought that Gowon and events were taking a dangerous turn and that it was essential for the Supreme Military Council, which had not been convoked since July 29, 1966, to meet. Since the situation in the country made it impossible for the Military Governor of the East to attend a meeting in any area occupied by Northern troops, various suggestions of alternative venues were put forward by him. So anxious indeed was he to attend the meeting that he purchased an executive plane to facilitate his journey to any acceptable venue. For long, however, his suggestions were treated with levity by Lt.-Col. Gowon, but eventually it was unanimously agreed that the meeting should hold outside Nigeria.

Nigeria represented by Gowon and Biafra by Ojukwu went off to Aburi, Ghana to see if there was anything to salvage before Nigeria is consumed by the mistrust and break down of law and order that encapsulated the nation then. In Aburi, an accord was reached and communiqu� issued and war was then as good as averted. Then Gowon came back from Aburi meeting and decided to renegade on the accord and agreements signed in Ghana because the bureaucrats then in Lagos (who were mostly Yorubas) told him that he signed away too much to the Igbos and that he allowed Ojukwu to deceive him into signing what will not favour Nigeria as a nation. Gowon being the kind of person he was then decided to renegade on the accord, then Ojukwu had no other choice but to declare war.

To be concise and precise, these were agreed upon in Aburi:

The Supreme Military Council that subsequently met at Aburi, Ghana, on 4th and 5th January, 1967 agreed on the following:

1. to resolve the question of leadership within the army, restore the chain of command which had become badly disrupted, and examine the crisis of confidence amongst the officers and soldiers which had rendered it impossible for them intermingle;

2. to evolve ways and means of carrying on the responsibility of administering the country until a new constitution had been determined; and

3. to tackle realistically the problems of displaced persons. These considerations were reflected in the agenda which was agreed upon by members of the Supreme Military Council.

0n the first day of the meeting, the Military Governor of the East put forward a resolution, which the meeting endorsed, calling on the military leaders to renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis. It was this resolution which was embodied in a communiqu� issued by the Council at the end of the first day of the meeting.

After deliberating anxiously and seriously on the reorganization, administration and control of the Army, the meeting reached aft agreements on the following lines.

1. The Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.

2. Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.

3. Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.

4. Matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police, to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

5. During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.

6. Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.

It was further agreed by the Supreme Military Council that a Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions should meet within two weeks from the date of receiving instructions to prepare statistics which would show:

1. Present strength of Nigerian Army;

2. Deficiency in each sector of each unit;

3. The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;

4. Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command.

Pending the completion of the work of the Committee, it was agreed by the Council that further recruitment of soldiers throughout the country should cease.

On the implementation of the agreement reached by representatives of the Military Leaders on 9th August, 1966, the Council reaffirmed the principle that Army personnel of Northern origin should return to the North from the West. In order to meet the security needs of the West it was agreed that a crash programme of recruitment and training was necessary but that the details should be examined after the Military Committee had finished its work.

It was in the course of discussing the reorganization of the Army that the crucial issue of the assumption by Lt. Col. Cowon of the offices of Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government arose. The Governor of the East, in explaining why it was impossible for him to recognize Lt. Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander, pointed out that the fate of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the legitimate Supreme Commander, was yet unknown and so no one could succeed him; that in the absence of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi whoever was the next senior officer in rank should manage the affairs of the country; and that the East was never party to any decision to appoint Lt. Col. Gowon Supreme Commander. Subsequently, Lt. Col. Gowon volunteered information regarding the murder of the Major General and his host, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, on 29th July, 1966. The Supreme Military Council decided to accord the late military leaders the full honours due to them.

The Supreme Military Council recognized that with the demise of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi no other Military Leader could command the support of the entire Nigerian Army and that a new arrangement was necessary for an effective administration of the whole country. The Council also took cognizance of the fact that extreme centralization had been the bane of the Military Regime in the past and that it was essential to re-define the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-�-vis the Regional Military Governments in order to ensure public confidence and co-operation.

When the Supreme Military Council resumed its deliberations at Aburi on 5th January, after members had spent the night at their various posts with their advisers, it proceeded to discuss the powers of the Federal Military Government vis-�-vis the Regional Governments. The upshot was that the Council re-affirmed its previous decisions on the reorganization of the Army and also took the following additional decisions:

On appointments to certain posts.

The following appointments must be approved by the Supreme Military Council:

1. Diplomatic and Consular posts.

2. Senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.

3. Super-scale Federal Civil Service and Federal Corporation posts.

On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decisions affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors for comment and concurrence. That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14th January and list all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees concerned so that they may be repealed not later than 21st January, if possible.

That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military Government, having nothing to do whatsoever with politicians.

The next item discussed was the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference which Lt. Col. Gowon had unilaterally dissolved on 30th November, 1966. The Council agreed that the Conference should resume sitting as soon as practicable to continue from where it left off, and that the question of implementing the unanimous recommendations of the Conference in September, 1966 should be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

Finally, on the problem of displaced persons, the relevant section of the Official Minutes of the Council reads as follows:

1. on rehabilitation, that Finance Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should send three representatives to the meeting;

2. on employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31st March, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons.

On his return from the Aburi meeting �������.. To Be Continued

THE THANKS IS ALL YOURS!!!

Reference: The main Aburi Communiqu�