FEATURE ARTICLE


Ubanese NwangangaTuesday, May 6, 2003
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Cape Town, South Africa


I AGREE WITH PROFESSOR OMO OMORUYI


he endorsement of president Obasanjo and categorization of presidential candidates of Igbo extraction as spoilers by Prof. Omo Omoruyi, a Bini man, has, expectedly, drawn the anger of the Igbo intelligentsia. I am an Igbo man but I lay no claim to any intellectual achievements of the type of either Prof. Omoruyi or of the Igbo who have been enraged by the comments of the Bini man. Be that as it may, as a retired federal officer, I have, during my years of active service to the federal government, come to appreciate the post civil war problems of the Igbo as members of the Nigerian family. I wish to draw from this experience in my little contribution to the ongoing controversy.

Prof. Omoruyi talked about lack of vision among the Igbo leadership after the civil war. Is this not a self-evident truth? Now, let us consider the following.

UKPABI ASIKA ADMINISTRATION

Ukpabi Asika, as Administrator of the former East Central State, saw himself as an appointee of the federal authorities and therefore owed nothing to the Igbo. He was in office by the goodwill of those who had conquered Igboland. And he went ahead to unleash the worst form of administration on his kit and kin. But for the criticisms of Asika and his style of leadership by the Owelle of Onitsha, Asika�s own brother, other Igbo leaders kept quiet and were busy struggling for crumbs from Asika�s administration. It never bothered them that the appointment of a Yoruba as the federal commissioner for reconstruction and development after the war was tantamount to handing Igboland over to their arch rival for the final solution. Prof. Adedeji did not disappoint the architects of the plan.

THE INDIGENIZATION PROGRAMME

Besides, where was the Igbo leadership when the indigenization programme of the Gowon Administration was being launched? A Yoruba programme dressed in a national gab, its sole objective was Yoruba control of the national economy. The Igbo leadership will not claim ignorance of this fact. What was its response, even for the sake of posterity? I am yet to come across any reasoned opposition to the implementation of the programme from the Igbo leadership. The consequence of silence is one of the concerns of Prof. Omoruyi.

CREATION OF STATES

The creation of additional seven states by the Murtala Mohammed administration in 1976 showed not only the lack of vision by the Igbo leadership but its disarray as well. While the north and the Yoruba articulated their interests the Igbo leadership squabbled over the creation of Enugu state. I have heard that the split in Igbo leadership scuttled the creation of Enugu state in addition to Imo state, which was in the federal government plan. The split, I understand, was over the baseless concern expressed by some Igbo leaders that the creation of Enugu state would play into the hands of Chief Christian Onoh who was suspected of harbouring strong feelings against non Wawa Igbo. A committed leadership with vision would have ignored Chief Onoh and supported the creation of Enugu state. It would have been interesting to watch Chief Onoh declar! e property owned by non Wawa Igbo as abandoned property in the new Enugu state. The opportunity was lost and one of the consequences was the loss of Anioma state. Ebonyi state would have been created along side Abia state in 1991. This would have paved way for the creation of Anioma state by the Abacha administration in 1996 on the basis of the six geo-political zones. As it stands now, the north and Yoruba land cannot accept the creation of Anioma state without creating corresponding states for them as well as the minority zones. The imbalance in the number of states between Igbo land on one hand and the rest five zones on the other will therefore continue to exist. Since 1991,when Enugu state was created no property belonging to non Wawa Igbo has been declared abandoned in the state as happened in Rivers state after the war.

ATTITUDE OF IGBO LEADERSHIP TO EASTERN MINORITIES.

The history of bitterness against Igbo by the eastern minorities dates back to colonial times. It is too well known to be recounted here. However, it reached its peak during the civil war when the conduct of Biafran troops in the minorities� homeland left much to be desired. Since the end of hostilities, no Igbo leader has taken it upon him to apologize to these our brothers on behalf of the Igbo. This is a clear manifestation of lack of foresight. The national elections of 1979 and 1983 showed convincingly the electoral weight of the eastern minorities in our national politics as well as the politics of the old eastern region. The Igbo leadership must appreciate the fact that the Igbo cannot choose their neighbours and consequently, their fate and that of their neighbours are inexplicably linked.

I will agree with any Igbo leader who holds the view that the bitterness of the eastern minorities against the Igbo is a phobia. It is unfortunate that this is the case. If the Igbo sinned against their neighbours before the civil war so did the Hausa-Fulani sin against the Tiv, Birom, Angas, Igala, Idoma, Jukun, Bachama, Mumuye, etc. But when the clouds of war gathered in the horizon, the northern minorities identified their interests and joined hands with the Hausa-Fulani to defeat Biafra. There was no saboteur in their midst. They prosecuted the war with Spartan determination till the end. In spite of their invaluable contributions, nobody was, at the end of the war, in any doubt as to where the power of the north lied. They tagged along the Hausa-Fulani and in 1979 voted massively for the Hausa-Fulani controlled NPN.My argument here is! that if somebody like late Joseph Tarka, who fought the Hausa-Fulani to a standstill, before the war, over the creation of a region for his people, could join forces with the Hausa-Fulani to ensure victory for the north in 1979, why are the eastern minorities so bitter against their Igbo brothers?

Nigeria�s oil wealth is concentrated in the Niger Delta and Igbo land. For a reasonably long time after the war economic maps of Nigeria showed no drop of oil in Igbo land. Our brothers in the Niger Delta, savouring their newfound �freedom� were happy that the Yoruba were dealing with the Igbo. Lacking in foresight and contented with the crumbs from their God-given food they thought that all their problems in Nigeria had become a thing of the past with the Igbo out of contention in the Nigerian power equation. Little did they realize that it was not out of the generosity of the butcher that we have meat on our tables. The civil war was not fought to unite the country in order to enthrone justice and fair play for all. As events later showed the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani aided by the minorities of the Middle Belt embarked on the looting o! f the oil wealth of the Niger Delta and Igbo land on a scale only an army of occupation could embark on in an over run territory. The victorious allied armies did not visit such looting on the Germans and the Japanese after World War II. Today, there is no retired senior military officer from the north and Yoruba land who are not involved in oil business. The allocation of oil blocks by the Obasanjo administration is an eloquent testimony of the design of the southwest and the north to enrich themselves at the expense of the owners of the oil wealth. Any wonder then that a commentator rightly pointed out that �our oil has become their wealth�?

I mentioned earlier that the conduct of Biafran troops in the eastern minorities� homeland during the war was detestable. I am not convinced that the scale of the misconduct compares with the Tiv massacre of 1964 inspired by the Hausa-Fulani leadership.

In spite of the fore going I am of the view that the Igbo leadership should tender a formal apology to the eastern minorities for past injustices. Whether or not such apology would be acceptable is a different matter altogether which ought not bother the Igbo leadership. The important thing is to remove the burden of guilt and rest your case.

IGBO OBSESSION WITH LAGOS.

Lagos was until 1992 the capital of Nigeria. In that capacity, it was the principal centre of government activity including expenditure of much of federal revenue. Consequently, it held great opportunity for everybody who needed a piece of the action. In other words, Lagos was like a magnet, which attracted Nigerians from different walks of life. The Igbo were not left out. In fact, one can say with out contradiction, that Lagos attracted more Igbo than any other ethnic nationality. The numerical superiority of the Yoruba in Lagos is as a result of the indigenous Yoruba populations in Lagos and around Ogun state. The movement of the federal capital out of Lagos returned it to its original owners, the Yoruba. While the movement to Abuja has made it the centre of attraction, for obvious reasons, Lagos has, without doubt, remained the commerc! ial nerve centre of the country. The accommodating spirit of the Yoruba, borne out of their capacity to compete favorably with any other group, has allowed the Igbo to continue in Lagos as if nothing has changed. However, the potential for conflict between the two ethnic nationalities over Lagos is increasing by the day. This is a manifestation of lack of vision on the part of the Igbo leadership. It is axiomatic that consumers create or make markets. It is also true that consumers can go to any length to get the commodities that will satisfy their desires. Therefore, the continued Igbo investment in Lagos cannot be justified by the argument that Lagos has a seaport as well as an international airport. Although in a hostile territory, Port Harcourt boasts of both a lage seaport and an international airport. I hold the view that Igbo investments in Igbo land can expand using Port Harcourt and Calabar as entreport. Notwithstanding the abandoned property saga of the immediate p! ost war era, in the long run Igbo investments in eastern minorities are much safer than in Yoruba land. Even in the unlikely possibility that governments in Port Harcourt, Yenegoa, Uyo and Calabar nationalize Igbo investments in Rivers, Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Cross River states, the trickle down effects can have some impact in Igbo land than would similar action in Yoruba land.

The Igbo obsession with Lagos has, unfortunately, snowballed into politics. The desire of the Igbo to produce a governor in Lagos is an abuse of Yoruba hospitality. This also shows that the Igbo leadership has no sense of history. What makes the Igbo think that the Yoruba would forget the events of 1959 and vote to put an Igbo man in Alausa? Being the second largest ethnic nationality in Lagos, what the Igbo would do is to go for any Yoruba candidate who would recognize them as a force to reckon with in the state. Assuming the Igbo are in majority in Lagos, going for its governorship is politically insensitive. Should the Igbo take hospitality of their hosts for weakness? How many riots, inspired by envy though disguised as religious, have we had between the Igbo and the Caliphate in places like Kano, Kaduna, etc? Only God knows what will ! happen the day an Igbo man will show interest in the political affairs of the Caliphate in its domain.

My contention therefore is that the Igbo obsession with Lagos is uncalled for. It is stifling development in Igbo land. The earlier the Igbo leadership realizes this the better for the future of the Igbo in Nigeria. Lagos is a Yoruba city. No amount of wishful thinking can change it.

ERRAND BOYS OF THE CALIPHATE

The general elections of 1979 showed that the Yoruba were the main contenders for power against the Caliphate. Besides, the half-hearted attempts by the so-called progressives to forge a common political front to challenge the status quo sent jitters to the northern ruling class. The arrowheads of the progressive alliance were the Yoruba and the Igbo. This threat to the hold on power by the north had to be contained. Thus, using the military wing of the Caliphate, the threat was removed by sacking the Shagari government in the dying hours of 1983. The Caliphate therefore regained its position as well as the initiative.

However, the conduct of the Buhari administration was not reassuring to the Caliphate. Being masters in the political game they were not ignorant of the danger Buhari�s arrogance posed to the collective interest of the north and that power could easily slip out of their hands if not properly handled. Therefore, even though Buhari and his second in command were both of the Hausa-Fulani stock, they had to go in the over all interest of the Caliphate. The result was the Babangida coup of August 27 1985.

To rekindle the mutual distrust between the Yoruba and the Igbo, Ukiwe, an Igbo, was appointed the Chief of General Staff. This office was equivalent to the office of a Vice President. However, in order to avoid a repeat of what happened in 1976 after the assassination of Murtala Mohammed when Obasanjo became Head of State by accident, Ukiwe�s office did not confer on him superiority over officers of northern extraction who were senior to him in rank. Unlike the case of Musa Y�Aradua, who was given double promotion from Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General after being appointed Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters with the powers of a second in command, Ukiwe was not so promoted in order to make him an effective second in command. Besides, while Babangida took the title of President, Ukiwe was not made a Vice President. How this served ! the interest of the Caliphate is too well known to be recounted here.

The point being made here is that starting from the regime of Babangida, Igbo leaders began to fall head over heels in their attempts to serve the interests of the Caliphate and in turn spite the Yoruba. The agitation to return the country to civilian rule was spearheaded by the Yoruba and the minorities of Bendel state. The mainstream Igbo leadership gave half-hearted support while working for Babangida to continue in office. Igbo leaders, who participated in the Babangida transition programme such as Nzeribe, Iwuanyanwu, etc, were double agents whose role was to frustrate Yoruba efforts at capturing power. This spoiler role reached its shameful height before and after June 12 1993 general elections, which were annulled after it became obvious that Abiola was poised to win against Tofa. Comrade Uche Chukwumerije became the Goebbels of the! Caliphate. Walter Ofonagoro pushed the errand boy role to new frontiers during Abacha�s infamy.

OMORUYI�S MOTIVES

Having taken time in the fore going paragraphs to agree with Omoruyi that Igbo leadership lacks vision, I wish now to address Omoruyi�s motive for what appears to many Igbo leaders as an insult to the Igbo nationality. In his second write up, Omoruyi clearly stated that he has no reason to hate or love the Igbo. Therefore, he was not advising the Igbo leadership to put its house in order because of the largeness of his heart. I tend to hold the view that his piece, viewed from this perspective, was written in bad faith with the aim of insulting the Igbo leadership. It is not impossible that having rubbished the Igbo leadership before the Nigerian public, he expects some reward from the Yoruba whose political interests he appears to be promoting. Several Igbo commentators have towed this line.

Secondly, it is possible that Omoruyi�s swipe at Igbo leadership was a mere intellectual exercise addressed to the reading general public without ulterior motives.

Thirdly, it is possible that Omoruyi�s piece was a genuine expression of concern for the rudderless leadership of one of the major ethnic nationalities in the country. Viewed from this angle, Omoruyi would appear to have sounded a warning to the Igbo leadership of the inherent danger of continuing in the same path that has, since the end of the war, led it to nowhere. Omoruyi hinted at this.

From the fore going, my conclusion is that the Bini intellectual might have written with a combination of the three motives. But what is important to me is the message and not the messenger. Although the southern minorities take delight in the plight of the Igbo, a good advice from them cannot be thrown into the trashcan just because of its source.

IGBO IN THE ONGOING TRANSITION PROGRAMME.

Before this piece is published the first and second set of the scheduled elections might have taken place. This does not stop any one from taking an objective assessment of the involvement of Igbo leadership in the programme. Barring any unforeseen circumstances or circumstances beyond our control, elections are expected to take place every four years in the system of government adopted by the ruling elite in Nigeria. Keen observers of the contest for political power are aware that no group that wants power waits until the dying minutes before throwing itself into the fray. After the PDP primaries of 1999, the mainstream Igbo leadership seemed satisfied with whatever crumbs they could get from President Obasanjo.Even the leader of this group, Dr. Ekwueme himself, short of taking a ministerial appointment, almost became part of the Obasanjo! government. There is nothing wrong with this. It only became a matter of concern when participation in the government signaled the end of preparations for 2003. There was therefore no serious Igbo plan to take a shot at the Presidency come 2003 until 2002. My choice of �no serious Igbo plan� is deliberate. This is to stress the point that while the Igbo first eleven team went to sleep, it cleared the way for fringe candidates to step in. In this group are Chekwas Okorie, Rochas Okorocha, Ike Nwachukwu, Jim Nwobodo and others. The painful thing is that after Orji Kalu took the President to task on his record in Igbo land vis-�-vis other geo-political zones, and went ahead to declare that the time had come for a Nigerian president of Igbo extraction, our best material for actualizing that dream continued in his deep slumber. To further compound the situation the Ohaneze did not take any concrete steps to put in place a plan for the so-called Igbo presidency project. All it di! d was to take over Governor Orji Kalu�s slogan as if sloganeering was going to do the magic. It is note worthy that while the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani power blocks had some degree of control over their governors through Afenifere and Arewa Consultative Forum (Arewa employed sharia effectively to control the seven states under APP); Igbo governors were their own masters. The result was the long drawn out struggle for authority between the governors and the Abuja group in each of the five Igbo states. The cost of the struggle, when quantified, will be considerable in terms of lives lost, property destroyed and general lack of development in Igbo land.

It was therefore a foregone conclusion that the Igbo would be humiliated in the two main political parties in the country if they sought to bear their flags. With the disastrous Ekwueme outing and the decision of the north to return to the saddle of power via the ANPP, the Igbo mainstream leaders represented by the Ohaneze suddenly remembered that Nigeria had always rested on a tripod of which the Igbo provided one leg. This was a delusion because the reality of the Nigerian political situation since the end of the war was that the third leg of the tripod represented by the Igbo had long been amputated. In its place were the southern minorities, a half leg, loosely fitted, which helped to support it, albeit unsteadily. In this grand delusion, the Ohaneze tried to impose its authority on the fringe candidates in order to give a semblance of! Igbo unity. Of course, their response was a swift rejection of Ohaneze�s authority. Pretending to be the Igbo equivalent of Afenifere, the Ohaneze went ahead to declare Ojukwu the Igbo consensus candidate.

The involvement of Ojukwu as a presidential candidate in the transition programme is rather unfortunate and shows that Ohaneze has run out of ideas. Whether or not we like it the truth is that Ojukwu led a rebellion, no matter its justification, against the Nigerian nation. Any sober minded politician in Ojukwu�s situation would at best be an adviser. Ojukwu�s entry into the fray will cost Igbo sympathy from well meaning Nigerians who think that the Igbo have been unfairly treated. It is all in his character-he cherishes being in the limelight. This will also provide an insight into how he ran his pet project, Biafra.

What appears lost on the mainstream Igbo leadership is that even if all the Igbo candidates were to step down for Ojukwu, he would not win all the Igbo votes not to talk of making any inroad into the eastern minorities. What worries Prof. Omoruyi is that the loss of Igbo votes could lead to a run off election, which could be to the advantage of Buhari, the candidate of the Caliphate. And everybody knows very well that Buhari is the last person that Nigeria needs at this crucial time to move forward.

THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE IGBO

Obasanjo is not the best president Nigeria needs now. But he is decidedly the best among the contestants for the high office. That is why we, including the Igbo, should rally round him to ensure victory for Nigeria. Let us not forget this: victory for Buhari represents a return to the intimidating power of the mallam whose main interest is in the oil of the Niger Delta. A victory for Buhari is a victory for sharia, dictatorship, tyranny, and possible return of the military to politics. And we pretty know who benefits from military incursions into Nigerian politics. Igbo should join hand to prevent this.

The long-term objective of the Igbo is to capture power at the centre. However, this can only be achieved with sound short-term policies. These short-term policies could include the following:

  1. Building political bridges the most important being taking steps to earn the confidence of the eastern minorities. I underlined �earn� for understandable reasons. The over all objective here will be to reassure them that the Igbo do not pose any threat to their political and economic interests. This job has been made easy for the Igbo by the crying neglect of the area by successive northern and now Yoruba governments. The massive looting of their wealth by the agents of the Caliphate left the eastern and mid western minorities feeling cheated and betrayed. The Igbo leadership should have cashed in! on this. The amputation of the Igbo leg of the tripod made it easy for the Caliphate to hang Saro Wiwa and his kinsmen as well as the destruction of Ogoni land. Ditto for Yoruba destruction of Odi in Bayelsa state. The Yoruba have benefited most from the oil of the Niger Delta. All the oil companies have their head offices in Lagos. Yoruba make up over 50% of the work force of each oil company and the Yoruba account for over 60% of Nigeria�s external debt. The Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani benefit from the continued mistrust between the Igbo and the eastern minorities. The Yoruba and the Caliphate orchestrated the abandoned property saga. The first chairman of the Abandoned Property Committee was Col. Daramola, a Yoruba. Major David Mark, a surrogate son of the Caliphate, followed him. Instead of the Government of the Yoruba/Hausa-Fulani Republic of Nigeria to establish a mortgage bank to enable people from the eastern minorities to develop their own property, it encouraged t! he seizure of Igbo property the Rivers State Government so that the Igbo and the minority neighbors would remain permanently divided. The Igbo say that when a woman married twice, she knew which husband loved her more. There are evidences that the Igbo did not handle their relationship with eastern minorities capably before and during the civil war. I stand to be corrected that whatever the sins of the Igbo against the eastern minorities they would become child�s play when compared to what the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani have done to them since the end of the war.

  2. As a confidence building measure, the Igbo should promote and support the eastern minorities to produce the next president of Nigeria.

  3. Igbo should invest at home and in the eastern minorities to promote development and enhance mutual understanding.

  4. A forum should be established for the governors of all the states in the former eastern region to meet.

  5. Igbo should champion the creation of Anioma state. In doing this they should enlist the support of the rump Delta state, that is, the Urhobo, Ijaw, Isoko and Itsekiri.

  6. Igbo should work for the inclusion of all Igbo-speaking areas in the Igbo geo-political zone. The Yoruba are working on similar project. The beauty of this arrangement is that no group of Igbo should be made a minority anywhere in the country. It will ensure that federal slots allocated to the Igbo are available to all Igbo people.

  7. There is a crying need to put a stop to the ongoing emigration of able-bodied skilled Igbo to countries where they easily become criminalized by official policy of exclusion. These countries, which are too numerous to mention here, include South Africa, India, Pakistan, Thailand, etc.

  8. There is no ethnic nationality in Nigeria where everybody agrees with the mainstream leadership. However, the division in Igbo land has no parallel. Therefore, the Igbo leadership should constitute committees of Igbo intellectuals to study the causes of so much division in Igbo land. The reports of these committees should form the basis for a pan Igbo congress that could be attended by all interest groups such as students, traditional rulers, professionals, university teachers, school teachers, civil servants, market women, ocho passengers, drivers, etc. The congress could begin at the local government level and will be a continuous process. Any true Igb! o man or woman should be ashamed that despite our achievements in industry, business, academics, etc, we have become the laughing stock in Nigeria. It is indeed unfortunate that the people who produced the likes of Professors Kenneth Dike, J.C. Anene, Edozie, Kojo, Anthony Modebe, Chike Obi, Adiele Afigbo, Gilbert Onuaguluchi, Cyril Onwumechili, O.C. Nwanna, M.Echeruo, D.I. Nwoga, Ikenna Nzimiro, Ezejiofor, Nwogwugwu, Kalu Anya, Bath Nnaji, Anya O. Anya, Ezeiro, Eme Awa, Humphrey Nwosu; justices Louis Mbanefo, Daddy Onyeama, Ibekwe, C. Oputa, A. Nnamani, Agbakoba, A. Aniagolu; Ambassadors I.Olisemeka, Tim Mgbeokwere, Lawrence Agubuzo, Wadibia-Anyanwu, George Obiozor; Drs. Joy Ogwu, Akunyili, Alvan Ikokwu, Chukwuemeka Ezeife, Mbadinuju, Akanu Ibiam, Arthur Nwankwo, Nathaniel Anah, Olisa Agbokaba, Clement Nwankwo, Jim Nwobodo, Aja Nwachukwu, Jaja Wachukwu, Paul Ogwuma, Sam Mbakwe, Pius Okigbo, the Owelle of Onitsha, Igwe Okechukwu, the Obi of Ogbaland, Lady Nwizu, Chief J. Mpi! , Chief Osadebey, Akanu Ibiam, Obi Wali, Alex Ekwueme, Christian Onoh, the Nwodos, Chuba Okadigbo, Ezekiel Izuogu, Edwin Umezeoke, Nwafo Orizu, Francis Ellah, B.U. Nzeribe, S.M.C. Ihekwuazu, Michael Okpara, Claude Ake, Pat Utomi, Emeagwali; Allison Madueke,Ndubuisi Kalu, Chijioke Kaja, Ebitu Ukiwe; Momah, Canice Umuenwahiri, Iweze, Emmanuel Ifeajuna Chukwuma Nzeogwu, Patrick Anwunnah, Conrad Nwawo, Joe Achuzie, Mike Okwechime, Fred. Chijiuka, Alex Madiebo, Tim Onwuatuegwu, Patrick Amadi, Hilary Njoku, Ikemba Nnewi, Ogbugo Kalu, Asonya; AIGs Ihemjirika, Ogbonna Onovo, Nzenwa, Ugboaja, Nwazomudo; Pini Jason, Echereome Nnannah, Nduka Ogbaibena, Ikonta, Chris Anyanwu, Amanze Obi, Don Adinuba, Tom Chigbo, Frank Ugboaja, Chidinma Ibegbu, Mary Kanu, Eziuche Ubani, Edwin Madunagu, Comfort Obi, Elechi Amadi, etc, are today receiving lectures on how to! put their house in order from a Bini �boy�. Any of you who are still alive and have allowed 419ners and errand boys to take the centre stage in Igbo land should be ashamed of yourselves.

  9. Igbo should reach out to the middle belt especially the Tiv, Idoma, Igala, etc. These people detest Igbo for being noisy, obtrusive, and arrogant. Igbo did not sin against them, so finding a common ground would not be too difficult. Now that the people of the middle belt are trying to define their identity Igbo support could be useful.

  10. Igbo should get involved in finding a lasting solution to the ethnic crises in the Niger Delta.

  11. Igbo should support the creation of Delta state.

  12. Igbo should reach out to the ethnic minorities of Edo state.

  13. In view of Igbo investments in Yoruba land and considering Yoruba pivotal role in Nigerian politics, which will receive more boosts if Obasanjo is re-elected, friendship with Yoruba should not be under estimated.

  14. Finally, whether or not we like it, the Hausa-Fulani are masters of Nigerian politics. They are desperate to return to the saddle and would stop at nothing to achieve it. In the past they used the Igbo to keep the Yoruba at bay. Realizable Igbo interests should define Igbo permanent interests and in consequence Igbo attitude to the Hausa-Fulani. The emergence of Atiku Abubakar as a force to reckon with in Hausa-Fulani politics is an interesting development. In fact, the alliance between the Atiku led faction and the Yoruba represents a serious threat to Igbo interests in the country. It has been shown that an alliance between South West and North Ea! st stands a better chance of winning the support of the minorities of the middle belt as well as those in the south. The reason for this is not far fetched. The middle belt minorities, who are predominantly Christians, will be more at home with the Atiku tendency which de-emphasizes Islamic fundamentalism. With the support of the southern minorities, its alliance with the Yoruba is a winning combination any day. On the other hand, the northern tendency represented by Buhari with its zealous support for Islamic resurgence is a cul-de-sac. Therefore, even if it is too late in the day to disengage now, the Igbo should consider that option as a long-term strategy. Thereafter, Igbo leaders who now work for the Atiku-Obasanjo alliance should be relied on to find accommodation for the Igbo within the alliance.

I have, in the fore going paragraphs, attempted to show why Omoruyi� message should not be dismissed as an insult to the Igbo. I have also shown that the message might not have been given out of his generosity. Accordingly, I suggested that the message be accepted while ignoring the messenger. I looked at the options open to the Igbo if they wish to reposition themselves in the quest for control of political power in Nigeria. My positions are informed by the fact that the Igbo were defeated by the combined might of north and south minus the Igbo. This defeat, real as it is, translated to a diminution of Igbo influence in all spheres of our national life and cannot be wished away. The random appointment of an Igbo man to a position of authority gave him a false sense of reintegration into the mainstream of activities in Nigeria. It is this ! false sense of acceptance that, without any strategic planning, the Igbo began to chorus �it is our turn�. The Igbo would have to put their house in order and then carry out aggressive fence mending with a view to reassuring those who will be frightened by Igbo resurgence. Unfortunately, with their house in disarray and without building political bridges to win vital support, they embarked on the �Igbo Presidency Project�, which will surely collapse like a park of cards.

Prof. Omoruyi claimed that the minorities of Nigeria led to rest at the constituent assembly the politics of the tripod. I am not quite sure of this. In his article on the candidates that would meet the criterion of geographical spread in the forthcoming presidential election, he singled out Buhari and Obasanjo. These candidates represent the two legs of the tripod. Had Buhari and Atiku not come out at the same time from the same leg of the tripod, the north with the support of the eastern minorities and the Igbo would easily meet the geographical spread requirement. What Omoruyi would have said is that since other Nigerians are united in their hatred of the Igbo, the constituent assembly only succeeded in making contest for political power in Nigeria bipolar. The action of the minorities therefore had the effect of ensuring that the amput! ation of the third leg of the tripod became irreversible, for the time being.

Omoruyi alleged that the Igbo have not accepted the 36 states structure, preferring instead the six-zone arrangement created by the Abacha administration. This contrasts with the facts on the ground. The Igbo have never suggested the abolition of the states or the return to old regional structure. They accept that states should be grouped into zones based on affinity. This, with the restructuring of the local governments in order to reflect the relative population strengths of each geo-political zone and resource control, is my understanding of restructuring Nigeria to establish a true federation and in consequence a stable polity. Surprisingly, Omoruyi, in one breath dismissed the zonal arrangement as unconstitutional, and in another breath, he urged his people of Edo and Delta states and the eastern minorities to close ranks to claim the! presidency in 2007 without concession to Igbo. I begin to wonder if Omoruyi hails from more than one state. A case of attacking the Igbo unjustifiably or self-contradiction?

Some reactions to Omoruyi have tended to give the impression that the Igbo are in competition with Edo. This is not the case. The Igbo know their competitors in the struggle for power in Nigeria. These are the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani. For the Igbo to compete with the Edo would amount to a crash from the top of Mount Everest. The appointments of Aikhomo and Akhigbe as seconds in command at different times did not amount to promoting Edo to the premier league.

Finally, I wish to posit that the eastern minorities are playing rigid politics, not politics of realism. A cardinal principle in politics is that there is no permanent enemy or friend in the pursuit of power. What is permanent are, no doubt, well-articulated interests. The minorities of the east have since the end of the war, in spite of realities on the ground, behaved as if their salvation rests squarely on the north. What they have failed to accept is that their relationship with the north can last as long as northern interests are served. They have freedom or liberation stadium in Port Harcourt, all in attempt to perpetuate unnecessary hate against the Igbo in the state. There is no liberation stadium in Makurdi or Jos. The people of those states do not think that stoking the embers of hate is in their interest. This is despite the fa! ct that many people from there were forced to denounce their Christian faith to embrace Islam before they could belong.

Now, consider the offshore/onshore oil controversy. What is at stake is the interest of the north and southwest as regards revenue generated from oil. They have made it clear that the north must have dominant share of the revenue from oil irrespective of where the oil is located. Obasanjo, in order to win re-election, agrees with them.

This flies in the face of the much-touted permanent friendship between the north and the eastern minorities. Whether Obasanjo or Buhari wins the election the north will not lose out. Therefore, let the eastern minorities have a change of heart in their attitude to the Igbo. Igbo cannot continue to be their permanent enemy. However, nobody should expect any such change soon, not in the lifetimes of Chief Melford Okilo, Chief N.U.Apkan, Alabo Graham Douglas, Patrick Ani, Diette Spiff, Joseph Wayas, Don Etiebet, Air Vice Marshall Nsikak Eduak, and Amb. G.B. Preware, who would like to see the Igbo drowned in the Atlantic.