An open enemy is better than a false friend. (Greek Proverb)
Our enemies teach us life’s most valuable lessons. (Chinese Proverb)
One does evil enough when one does nothing good. (German Proverb)
One enemy can harm you more than a hundred friends can do you good. (German Proverb)
He who sows peas on the highway does not get all the pods into his barn. (Danish Proverb)
Learning is like rowing upstream; not to advance is to drop back. (Chinese Proverb)
Don’t run too far, you will have to return the same distance. (Biblical Proverb)
Between saying and doing, many a pair of shoes is worn out. (Italian Proverb)
Weaving a net is better than praying for fish at the edge of the water. (Chinese Proverb)
Only the man who crosses the river at night knows the value of the light of day. (Chinese Proverb)
Not enjoyment and not sorrow is our destined end or way: But to act, that each to-morrow finds us further than to-day. (Henry Wadsworth Longfellow)

Continued from Part II

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n his return from the Aburi meeting, the Military Governor of the East held a press conference to reassure Easterners who had considerable apprehension about the meeting and its outcome. He emphasized at this conference, that the Aburi meeting had been worthwhile and gave the assurance that provided the agreements reached were implemented much progress would have been made towards relieving tension and banishing fear within the country.

As stated earlier: On returning back to Nigeria , Gowon on the advice of the bureaucrat did things differently:

1. by deciding that a meeting of the Supreme Military Council will be properly constituted and can properly be held if any Military Governor is absent, but as agreed at Accra, any Military Governor not present will be given the opportunity to express his comments on, and concurrence with, the decisions taken in his absence before they are implemented.

2. Where all the Military Governors are present at a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, decisions should now be taken only with the concurrence or unanimity of the Military Governors. Decisions by majority would have been the best thing in ordinary circumstances but in the present situation in the country, one has to admit that such a rule could lead to open disagreements and conflicts and so to the revival of tension which everything must be done then to reduce.

Again, the Eastern Military Government readily sent representatives to the meeting of the Committee of Army Officers at Benin which, as was agreed at Aburi, would discuss matters relating to the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each Unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, as well as the sharing out of such arms equitably to the various Commands. The Committee could not progress with its work for lack of co-operation from the representatives of Lt. Col. Gowon.

While the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria made a determined and sincere effort to act according to the spirit and decisions of Aburi, Lt. Col. Gowon deliberately set out to ignore both. Ten days after the Aburi meeting, Gowon´s Government issued a booklet, entitled Nigeria 1966, parts of which attacked and libelled the Military Governor of the East. The booklet also contained tendentious statements the sole aim of which could only have been to inflame passions and cause disaffection within the country. This booklet was launched in New York, London and other capitals of the world.

Worse still, three weeks after the meeting, at a press conference which he held on 26th January, 1967, Lt. Col. Gowon reproduced a truncated and distorted version of the agreements reached at Aburi. The source of Lt. Col. Gowon´s statement was not the official minutes of the meeting, which had been prepared by his own officials, but a hostile commentary on the Aburi decisions prepared afterwards by people with vested interests in Lagos. Men who were neither members of the Supreme Military Council nor were present at the meeting! These people were in a position to advise Lt. Col. Gowon before the meeting since the agenda for the Aburi meeting were agreed to well beforehand. Furthermore, most of the major decisions at Aburi were taken on the second day of the meeting after members had spent the night at their respective stations, consulting with their advisers.

A few days after Aburi, some Permanent Secretaries in Lagos met to criticize the decisions reached by the Supreme Military Council, the highest authority in the land. With regard to the reorganization of the Army they objected to the new title of "Commander-in-Chief" on the grounds that:

1. it would be a subtle way of either abolishing the post of Supreme Commander or declaring it vacant to be filled by unanimous decision of the Supreme Military Council... and

2. the Accra decision transfers the Executive Authority of the Federal Military Government from the Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander (in accordance with Decree No. 1) to the Supreme Military Council. The implication of this, according to them, was that the Commander-in-Chief would have no power of control or dismissal over the Regional Governors.

On the establishment of Military Headquarters: The Permanent Secretaries stated that "the establishment of Military Headquarters with equal representatives from the Regions headed by a Chief of Staff amounts to confederation". They made no effort to define what they meant by a "confederation".

As regards to the creation of Area Commands: The Permanent Secretaries took exception to what they considered to be "dividing up the Nigerian Army into Regional ones, without links with or effective unifying control over the Army by the ‘Supreme Commander’” This advice, which was clearly motivated by selfish interests, ignored the anxiety of the Nigerian public for a workable and effective settlement of the crisis and a quick return to normal conditions. In strict compliance with this advice, however, Lt. Col. Gowon, true to his well-known characteristic of ignoring solemn agreements, made a volte-face at his press conference. On the issue of the reorganization of the Army he declared:

"We reviewed the situation in the Nigerian Army and we all agreed that there should be one Nigerian Army under a unified command as at present. We recognized that in the context of the events of 1966, the most practical way of achieving this aim is to organize the Army into area commands. The preponderance of the army personnel in each command will be drawn from the indigenes of that area. Each area command will be under an Area Commander who will take operational instructions from the Military Headquarters which will be directly under me as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Under the proposal, the Military Governors can use the area command for internal security purposes but this will normally be done with the express permission of the Head of the Federal Military Government. We definitely decided against Regional armies."

As could be seen from the Minutes of the Aburi Conference (for those that have read it), no decision was taken that the Area Commands should be directly under Lt. Col. Gowon "as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces" nor that the Military Governors should obtain his permission to use the Area Commands for internal security.

Again, instead of emphasizing that the Supreme Military Council, in recognition of the fact that no single government in the Federation has its writ running throughout the country, has introduced the element of Regional consent into the process of reaching its decisions, Lt. Col. Gowon merely stated:

"We, however, agreed to return to the status quo ante 17th January, 1966, and this is in keeping with my earlier public pronouncements that Decrees or parts of Decrees which tended towards over- centralization should be repealed. We will continue to operate the existing Federal Constitution and the Federal system of government until a new Constitution is drawn up. A decree is now under preparation which will give effect to the decision to return to the Constitutional position before 17th January, 1966..."

Turning to the problem of displaced persons: When the meeting of Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance resumed, they agreed that:

1. the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed as it was not mentioned in the minutes of the Accra meeting.

2. the decision to continue to pay salaries till the end of March, 1967, does not take into consideration economic factors which are linked with it . . . Secondly, it does not make sense to include daily paid workers among those whose salaries should continue to be paid. The decision should therefore be reconsidered.

The insistence of the Permanent Secretaries that "the principle of revenue allocation should not be discussed" at any future meetings of Permanent Secretaries, Finance, was a clear evidence that they intended to strangle the East economically since they are well aware of the mass return of nearly two million Easterners to the Region, the loss of £20,000,000 in property by refugees from the North and the forcible exclusion of Easterners from the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Statutory Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions. Surely they couldn’t have expected the East to survive economically in these circumstances under the existing system of revenue allocation. Moreover, whatever economic factors were linked with the Supreme Military Council’s decisions on this matter, it was then patent that the displaced employees were in no way responsible for their plight. And the inequitable treatment suggested by the Permanent Secretaries in respect of daily paid workers could have only reminded the country of the industrial strife which such an application of double standards caused in the days of the then former civilian regime.

In spite of all these, Lt. Col. Gowon in his press conference deferred to the recommendations of the Permanent Secretaries on this issue. Although the decision at Aburi was that the salaries of all displaced persons who had not obtained alternative employment should, without qualification, be paid until 31st March, 1967. Lt. Col. Gowon stated that "each case is to be considered on its merit" and that Federal Corporations would find it "very difficult" to continue to pay their displaced employees.

With respect to appointments to certain posts in the Federal Public Service, the Permanent Secretaries commented as follows:

1. that, which ever category of officer is meant, the effect of this decision will tend to paralyse the functions of the Federal Public and the Police Service Commissions;

2. that, if Regional Governors have power to appointments, the loyalty of Federal Officers would be to their regions of origin meaning in effect that there will be no Federal Civil Service;

3. that, the acceptance of this decision would also require, as the law officers have reported, amendments to those sections in the Constitution dealing with appointment to Nigeria Police, Federal Public Service Commission and sections of various acts dealing with appointment in Federal Statutory Corporations;

4. and that, furthermore, it is observed that while Military Governors will have power to appoint, or approve appointments of Federal Government Civil Servants, there is no corresponding power of the Supreme Military Council to even influence the appointments to senior posts in the Regional Public Services.

Obviously the Permanent Secretaries were not concerned with the peace, stability and even the survival of Nigeria; their sole interest was to maintain the status quo because any attempt at a fair distribution of posts in the Federal Civil Service, the Federal Corporations, the Foreign Service and other Federal institutions would have meant a diminution of the powers they then enjoy. For them then, the East must remain permanently excluded from these services and institutions for the selfish ends of Federal Permanent Secretaries. The East must be relegated to obscure embassies abroad where they will be ineffective and unheard. In his press statement Lt. Col. Gowon, in his attempt to keep to the advice of the Permanent Secretaries, was caught up in contradictions. In one and the same breath he said that these appointments should be approved by the Supreme Military Council and that the Federal public Service and Police Commissions should retain their present functions. His exact words were:

"There have been some speculations about the effect of our decisions on senior appointments and promotions in the Federal Public Service. It was agreed that top posts such as Permanent Secretaries and Ambassadors will have to be approved by the Supreme Military Council. I would like to explain that the Army, Federal Public Service Commission as well as the Police Commission will continue to function as at present."

Finally, on the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, the Permanent Secretaries stated that it was rather advisable for Gowon to stick to their previous recommendations and advice, namely:

1. that, the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely;

2. that, the immediate political programme announced to the nation on 30th November, 1966, by the ‘Supreme Commander’ should be implemented and the country must be so informed.

The Permanent Secretaries had here revealed that the origin of Lt. Col. Gowon´s "political programme" of 30th November, 1966, was "the recommendations and advice" given to him by these Permanent Secretaries. In accordance with this advice, however, Lt. Col. Gowon, while not appearing to re-affirm "that the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference should stand adjourned indefinitely", said:

"So far I have not set up the Drafting Committee and the Constituent Assembly promised in my broadcast (of 30th November, 1966) because it was the intention that normal conditions should be fully restored before they begin to function... I am carrying on the necessary consultations with all sections of the Nigerian community and when eventually the names we are screening are announced the general public will be satisfied."

In this context, the indications were that Lt. Col. Gowon would rather take steps to implement his pet programme than facilitate the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference as decided at Aburi. This was borne out by the draft Decree which he produced after Aburi.

This draft Decree, which had been circulated to the Regional Military Governors by Lt. Col. Gowon, accordingly bypasses or ignores all the major decisions taken at Aburi. It seeked to return Nigeria to the constitutional position before 17th January, 1966, while in fact the decisions of the Supreme Military Council were on specific issues and were not limited by dates. In the draft Decree the title of "Supreme Commander" was still retained contrary to the decision at Aburi to alter it to "Commander-in-Chief". The draft Decree also retained the word "President" instead of "Chairman of the Supreme Military Council" as was agreed at Aburi. Again it enlarged the membership of the Supreme Military Council to include "Head of the Nigerian Army (a non-existent post), the "Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces" and the "Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army". No such decisions were taken at Aburi. It was merely agreed that there should be one Chief of Staff at Headquarters.

In addition, contrary to the Aburi accord, the draft Decree vested executive and legislative powers either in the Federal Military Government or in the Federal Executive Council. But the Aburi meeting clearly decided that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should devolve on the Supreme Military Council to which any matter affecting the whole country should be referred for determination.

The draft Decree also completely ignored the decision at Aburi that appointments and promotions within the upper hierarchy of the Army, Police, the Public Service and Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council.

Lastly, the draft Decree proceeds to restore sections 70, 71 and 86 of the old Constitution, which had been suspended, without also restoring the safeguards provided in that Constitution. By this action Lt. Col. Gowon, contrary to the spirit and letter of the Aburi agreements, arrogated to himself the power to declare a state of emergency anywhere in Nigeria.

Gowon was accused of taking Nigeria on a war part because…………….TO BE CONTINUED

THE THANKS IS YOURS!!!

Reference:

The main Aburi Communiqué

Segun Toyin Dawodu

SELECTED FEEDBACK:

JOHN OKEKE wrote (Congratulations on your feature articles): Mr. Ubochi,

Unfortunately the Nigeria Civil War completely disorientated the Igbos and in consequence has continued to churn out Igbo Politicians who willingly mortgage their conscience in pursuit of their personal political ambitions.

I congratulate you on your recent Feature Articles entitled Tenets of Aburi Accord as carried on Nigeriaworld. Since after the war, several writers in an attempt to blame the Igbos for the first coup, have deliberately distorted the facts. It is indeed encouraging that perhaps for the first time since after the war, the true version of the story is being retold.

May l suggest that your Articles be published in Nigerian newspapers like the Guardian, Champion etc. People like Dr. Reuben Abati of the Guardian, who once unashamedly suggested that the Igbos should beg forgiveness of their neighbours, following the war, may have a rethink after reading your Articles.

I look forward to reading your third instalment. My very best wishes.

OKEKE