FEATURE ARTICLE

Okezie ChukwumerijeFriday, April 29, 2005
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Houston, TX, USA

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WHY POPE BENEDICT XVI IS WRONG ABOUT RELATIVISM


n his homily at the mass held in the Vatican on Monday, April 18, Pope Benedict XVI (then known as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger) launched a scathing attack on moral relativism. It should be recalled that the homily was given to the congregation of cardinals just before the conclave for the election of the pope. In giving the homily, the Pope was, therefore, stating his views on the important issues facing the church and trying to concentrate the minds of the cardinals on the kind of person that would address these issues as the leader of the Catholic Church.


We will return presently to an evaluation of the Pope's critique of relativism, but let's tarry for a moment on why relativism loomed large in the Pope's mind as an issue worthy of discussion in the pre-election homily. Relativism has been a subject of philosophical debate in the West, but it scarcely features in public discourse in developing countries. In the developing world, poverty, hunger, AIDS, population explosion are real and serious issues.

People without food on their table, those inflicted with AIDS but who do not have the medicine with which to fight the disease, those who are unable to provide a decent quality of life for their children, do not sit and worry about the "dictatorship of relativism." Whatever energy they have left after their long days of fighting for survival is spent worrying about how to go through the next day.

If these indigent people in developing countries (a part of the world where there has been the largest increase of membership in the Catholic Church) were able to listen to the Pope's homily and understand it, they would probably have wondered why relativism trumped hunger, poverty and AIDS. Or, to put it differently, they would have wondered why the philosophical concerns of Westerners trump the practical problems of Catholics in the developing world. If they came to the conclusion that the Pope still views the Catholic Church as a Western Church (a church for European peoples), would they really be wrong? Or is it the Pope who is wrong in postulating the dangers of relativism as one of the most serious challenges facing humanity?

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Returning to the issue of relativism, here's what the Pope said:

"Today, having a clear faith based on the Creed of the Church is often labeled as fundamentalism. Whereas relativism, that is, letting oneself be 'tossed here and there, carried about by every wind of doctrine,' seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times. We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists of one's own ego and desires.

We, however, have a different goal: the Son of God, the true man. He is the measure of true humanism. An 'adult' faith is not a faith that follows the trends of fashion and the latest novelty; a mature adult faith is deeply rooted in friendship with Christ."

Moral relativism is, of course, the view that moral propositions are culturally or socially contingent - that these propositions are not based on absolute or universal truths but are the products of customs or social preferences. According to this view, there is no single standard by which to judge the objective truth of any particular ethical proposition. Public morality is, therefore, a reflection of social conventions which may vary from time to time, and from place to place.

The problem with moral relativism is that if followed to its ultimate destination, it brings us to a space where no moral claim can be objectively contradicted, because there is no independent way by which one can say that a particular moral claim is better than the other or is more grounded in the truth. For example, if you believe that that abortion is morally wrong, and I believe that abortion is morally justified in certain situations, a moral relativist would conclude that there is no way of determining which of these propositions is objectively right in a universal sense, since all moral propositions are reflections of social conventions.

Moral relativists do not contest the fact that a particular moral proposition may be accepted in a particular society. What moral relativists contend is that there is no way of determining whether the moral proposition that is accepted in a particular society is a universal or objective truth. It bears noting that very few people are actually moral relativists in the sense explained above. Moral pluralism - the view that different moral theories capture parts of the truth about moral life - has more adherents than does moral relativism.

Whatever one may think of the philosophical validity of moral relativism, there is no denying the fact that it promotes a healthy skepticism of the way society makes decisions about its values, especially of those decisions that involve choosing which values to enforce through the use of the police powers of the state. For example, a relativist may be reluctant to enact a particular religious tenet into law without first evaluating the tenet in the light of the broader goals of the particular society. Since the relativist does not accept religious tenets as absolute moral propositions, he would have to dig deeper, not rely merely on faith, as justification for the enactment of the tenet into law.

Contrast this with the position of a moral absolutist, who believes that the objective and universal truth of moral propositions is readily determinable. If the moral absolutist is a Christian, he will believe that the Bible is the ultimate, unchanging truth. Fair enough. In a state that respects religious freedom, we may all believe whatever we choose. You may believe in Christ, and I in Buddha, and my neighbor in Mohammed.

The danger with moral absolutism, however, is that if one truly believes in the absolute truth of moral propositions contained in religious texts, there is less incentive to negotiate with others about whether these propositions should be enforced by law. If I believe that abortion is evil because I believe the Bible says so, and I believe the bible is the absolute truth, and I believe that those who hold different positions on the issue are demonstrably wrong, there is limited space for me to engage in a public dialogue and negotiation about how society should deal with the issue of abortion. I have the truth. You don't. So shut up, listen to me, and do as I say.

Moral absolutism may then lead to irresolvable conflicts in a multi-religious society. If we each retain tenacious grips on our own versions of the truth and are unwilling to negotiate because we entertain no doubt about the objective truth of our respective positions, how can we live peacefully in the same society, without courting tragedy? Genuine tragedy, the German philosopher Hegel noted, is a case not of right against wrong but right against right - two equally justified ethical principles held by people of inflexible will.

The late Pope John Paul II once condemned the tendency to view relativism as "the attitude of though that corresponds better to democratic political forms, as if knowledge of the truth and adherence to it were an impediment." He continued: "Truth, exactly as Christ revealed it, is a guarantee of genuine and full freedom for the human person." In a society where an equal number of Moslems believe that "Truth, exactly as Mohammed revealed it, is a guarantee of genuine and full freedom for the human person," how is society to be organized so that people sharing these conflicting views of the truth can live together in harmony?

The foregoing is not an argument against people believing in the tents of their faith or in believing in the universality of certain moral propositions. It is a case for maintaining a healthy skepticism, a willingness to acknowledge that one's moral positions may not be right, that the truth not infrequently manifests itself in multiplicities of positions, and that, finally, one is not always the sole possessor of the "truth."

In his homily, Pope Benedict XVI stated that nowadays having a clear faith is labeled fundamentalism. Not quite true. It's not having a clear faith that is labeled fundamentalism. It is the belief that one's faith is the absolute and only truth, and that one should use the instruments of the state to promote the moral propositions of one's own faith, without considering the interests of those who may not share one's particular moral views. When commentators write about the dangers of fundamentalism - Moslem or Christian - they have in view those who see no demarcation between the state and religion, and who would, indiscriminately, use the powers of the state to promote their particular religious views, in a postmodern and multicultural world.

After lamenting the "dictatorship of relativism," Pope Benedict XVI noted that the goal of the church is "the Son of God, the true man. He is the measure of true humanism." Christians, and I am one, may well believe that Christ is the "true measure of humanism," but there are those among us who don't share this belief. If we live in the same society with those that don't share our certainty about the "true measure of humanism," how are we to relate to them? Should we use the instruments of the state to enact our understanding of the "true measure of humanism"? Or should we recognize that not all members of society are in accord about how humanism is measured?

The Pope's position may lead to the kind of fundamentalism that is condemned in the context of Islamic fundamentalism. It was not long ago that the Pope, as Cardinal Ratzinger, wrote that priests in the U.S. may properly deny communion to abortion rights supporters, including the Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry. Further down this track is perhaps a requirement that church members who are public official should not publicly espouse political opinions contrary to the teaching of the church?

When compared with the more pressing problems of hunger and deprivation confronting large sections of the world population, the dangers of relativism seem distant. In both the developing and the developed worlds, a more serious problem is the kind of fundamentalism that is fueled by moral absolutism, a fundamentalism that propels its adherents to whittle down or even deny the existence of a difference between the state and religion. One can only hope that the papacy of Benedict XVI would not provide succor and stimulus to these fundamentalists - Christians and Moslems - who want to eliminate the space for individual choice in modern life, and who want to impose their conceptions of what is right, however oppressive, on the rest of society.