FEATURE ARTICLE


Nnaemeka Luke Aneke, MDMonday, January 19, 2004
advertisement
[email protected]
Westbury, NY, USA

ANNOUNCE THIS ARTICLE TO YOUR FRIENDS


OBONG (General) PHILIP EFIONG:
A TRIBUTE TO AN UNCOMMON NIGERIAN (Part II of II)


s has been previously alluded to, Gen. Effiong�s serious appeal to the world to see that immediate relief came in for starving Biafrans was undercut by Gowon. As is already known, Gowon refused relief materials from relief agencies that helped Biafra as a punitive measure against them. Only the God of heaven will be able to explain Gowon�s mindset on how the rejection of relief material from a relief agency will punish the agency instead of those that needed the relief to escape death. But that was not the end of the relief bungle. Gowon used the Igbos to experiment on the efficiency of the Nigerian Red Cross. He boasted: �we will do it ourselves� but it took the Nigerian Red Cross more than two weeks from when Uli airport was shut down to deliver even trickles of relief to the heartland of Biafra. In the mean time, thousands of fragile refugees who had actually survived the war on meager rations succumbed to starvation and death in the interval between the closure of the Uli airport and the time it took the Nigerian Red Cross to overcome government red tape and inertia. (See New York Times, January 15, 1970; page14, column 3). This was notwithstanding Effiong�s cries and concerns.

It must be stated though that Gowon may not have intended the outcome to be so or know of the inefficiency of the Nigerian Red Cross in being able to cope with urgent relief need in a besieged and collapsed Biafra, but that does not detract from the true fact that it was an experimental and grossly insensitive move, on his part, to rely on an untested organization for such a massive and hitherto unprecedented job. Especially when the government of many countries wondered aloud why Gowon could not temporarily swallow his ego and allow relief agencies to use Uli airport to saturate Biafra with relief materials in a matter of hours or days of the end of the war instead of allowing relief to be trucked from Lagos 400 miles away by the Red Cross that lacked vehicles, organization and incentive. (See Anthony Lewis, New York Times columnist, January 23, page 2, column 3). In rejecting the relief meant to quickly revitalize the Igbos after the war, Gowon said �Let them keep their blood money. Let them keep their bloody relief supplies. We don�t want it �� The question is, who were the �we� that did not want the relief? Was it the well-fed Gowon with members of his SMC or the easterners who were dying in their thousands after 3 years of starvation? Who were the �we�? This was the final blow on Effiong�s effort to see that starving easterners would be fed.

Furthermore, in the midst of the chaos that attended Biafria�s capitulation and surrender, Effiong remembered that Ojukwu�s threat of guerilla warfare had not been renounced and could provide cover and justification for what Ojukwu called �the final solution to the Biafran problem�. To ensure that Federal forces, intoxicated by an unexpected military victory, did not use the pretext of a guerilla resistance to continue the Northern program, Gen. Effiong made to the whole world an emphatic and explicit renunciation of any guerilla resistance and assured the world that �Biafra has ceased to exist�. That done, Effiong effectively deprived Federal forces of any rational reason, real or imagined, to descend on the Biafran population, a real fear that was harbored not only by the easterners but also by the United States, France and the Vatican. The reality of this fear was reflected in the Pope�s prayer against the massacre of Biafrans and a statement by the United States Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson on January 12, 1970 that �today we have every reason to be encouraged that there would be no indiscriminate killing of Biafrans by the victorious forces of the Nigerian Government� (See New York Times, January 13, 1970; page14 column 1).

But beyond Effiong�s tactical and dexterous handling of the surrender, that ensured maximal salvage of Igbo lives at the end of the war, the Akangkang Ibiono Ibom did not relent in his efforts after the war to set the records right. He did that with superb success. Nigerians may remember that on August 1, 1966, when Gowon usurped the throne of Supreme Commander, he made a speech that was significant to this writer in two aspects: one, in what he said and the other, in what he did not say. First, he told the nation that Ironsi had been kidnapped by �mutinous troops� in Ibadan and that his whereabouts were unknown. Then what he did not say: unlike Ironsi, who announced a �search and rescue� operation for his boss, Balewa, which continued until the latter�s body was found, Gowon made no such �search and rescue� initiative for his own boss, the Supreme Commander. What is the significance?-that both the �mutinous troops� and the �unknown whereabouts� of Ironsi were both known to Gowon, which knowledge assured him that it was safe to rebel against the rest of the officers senior to him and self-proclaim himself Supreme Commander.

But Gowon�s role in Ironsi�s demise remained doubtful in the minds of some Nigerians until General Effiong stated categorically that Gowon�s fingers were stained with Ironsi�s blood. Presenting a paper at the War College in Abuja in late February 2002, General Effiong clarified history by stating without fear or favor, that Gowon was a Brutus to Ironsi. In the article captioned �Gowon Betrayed Ironsi, Says Effiong�, published in Nigeriaworld.com, Gen. Effiong made it clear that both Ironsi and Fajuyi were arrested at Ibadan governor's lodge by then Major Theophilus Danjuma �with the consent and approval of Lt.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon�. Of course, we also know that both Theophilus Danjuma and Joseph Akahan (Danjuma�s co-planner) were rapidly rewarded with promotions by Gowon for a job well done.

Gen. Effiong�s zeal to defend the true facts of the war never diminished, even to his last breath. Only few months ago when Gov. Orji Kalu of Abia State decided to take the paradoxical step of apologizing on behalf of Ndigbo for the civil war, Gen. Effiong, even in his last days, still made out time to condemn Gov. Kalu�s misplaced apology and ask Nidgbo to forgive him for such indiscretion. Gen. Effiong, in a palpable disgust, said of Gov Kalu: ��to make an apology this way is premature and uncalled for. What did he know about the war?�

Again, beyond his roles in Biafra�s surrender and efforts to set the records right, Gen. Effiong spent a great deal of effort trying to secure the military benefits and entitlements of the former Nigerian soldiers of eastern origin who fought on the Biafran side. He led delegations and rallies to the Federal Government in Abuja to attract attention to the need to settle these soldiers even though the Obasanjo/Danjuma establishment was not moved. Obviously, like many others after the war, it would have been easier for Gen. Effiong to go behind and try to use whatever connections he had in the army to secure only his own benefits. But true to his form, he thought it a mark of betrayal and insensitivity to fight only for his own benefits while the rest of the affected eastern officers were left in the rain. So he decided instead to take up the cause of all the affected soldiers.

Also, because Gen. Effiong is not a noisemaker, not many Nigerians know that he was the brain behind Gen. Ojukwu�s return from asylum in Ivory Coast. It was Gen. Effiong who pressured Shehu Shagari to grant pardon to Ojukwu. Initially, President Shagari told Gen. Effiong that he would first grant pardon to Gowon and see how Nigerians would react, and that if the reaction of Nigerians were not negative, then he would grant pardon to Ojukwu. Fortunately Gowon�s pardon went well and Gen Effiong resumed pressure on Shagari to pardon Gen. Ojukwu. When finally Shagari yielded to Effiong�s request, Effiong personally traveled to Ivory Coast to communicate the good news to Gen. Ojukwu, but insisted that both kept it secret until its consummation. Yet when Ojukwu returned and it was time for celebrations, airport ceremonies and fanfare, Gen. Effiong stayed away from the limelight to let Ojukwu have his day. What more can Effiong do for the Igbos in particular, and Nigeria in general, by bringing a final closure to the civil war epitomized by Ojukwu�s return?.

Post-war relationship with Igbos: Gen. Effiong�s post-war relationship with the Igbos cannot escape a thorough discussion and any attempt by Igbos to avoid the issue will be like one trying to escape his shadow. Whether Igbos like it or not, Major General Philip Effiong has become a part of the nuclear fabric of Igbo history. Any presentation of Igbos history that lacks Gen. Effiong�s role is incomplete and probably written by an enemy. Effiong�s role during the civil war, the surrender, the return of Ojukwu, his efforts to rehabilitate the ex-Nigerian soliders and his committed defense of the true facts of the war against intentional and accidental manipulation will stand the scrutiny of time.

But what did the Igbos do for Gen. Effiong? Unfortunately, the answer is none, at least according to the general himself. In what I believe was his last public interview before his death, in the Sunday Vanguard of September 21, 2003, (cited in Part I), Vanguard reporter, George Onah, ended the interview with Gen. Effiong thus:

Mr. Onah: How do Igbo people see you now? Gen. Effiong: I don�t know how to put it now, but I should say that they are not unfriendly but they are not overtly friendly. But, some Igbos are very nice, very friendly and the official Igbo group, the Ohanaeze, if you like, are not making the type of overtures I would have expected from them. Mr. Onah: Have the Igbo honoured you with any title? Gen. Effiong: No, no, no, I have not been honoured by them in any way.

This last news conference by Gen. Effiong is not good news for the Igbos. He made it clear in his words that as much as some Igbos were friendly and some were not, the Ohaneze, itself fell short of his expectation in terms of reaching out. But why should the Igboman care or be concerned about the welfare or wellbeing of Gen Effiong? The simple answer is that, like it or not, Igbos are IOU to Gen Effiong. But equally important, if not more, is that Igbos, like many ethnic groups in Nigeria need political alliances, coalition and amalgamations to make any impact at the center. And anybody or group contemplating such political cooperation with the Igbos will necessarily consider previous alliances of individuals and groups with the Igbos and how those people fared in success and in failure. It is sure that the story of Gen. Effiong is not an encouragement to such future alliances.

Again, obvious or not, observers are watching how those who had a privity of relationship with Gen. Effiong have treated him. As previously indicated, in an article in the Guardian of November 15 titled, �Effiong died in penury, Bassey, others lament� notable citizens and opinion leaders from Akwa Ibom/Cross River chastised the Nigerian Federal Government for its indifference and neglect of the Sword of Akwa Ibom. Similarly, they and others will be watching with keen interest what we Igbos make of the name of General Philip Effiong. Even if Igbos are able to prevail in the argument that their own neglect and subjugation by the Federal Government left them with no ability to show gratitude and benevolence to Gen Effiong, they will be hard pressed to explain to the neutral observer why his name should not be immortalized in Igboland.

This is after all one who is not only a friend of the Igbos but one that has given his sweat and blood more for the Igbo cause than indeed that of his own people, and who believed that the inability of the eastern people to present a common front has left them divided and looted by being pitched against one another. It cannot be overemphasized that Igbos must use the name of Effiong to show other individuals and groups that they will not forget one that have allied with them whether the outcome is sweet or bitter. And they must show it unmistakably, convincingly and with clarity.

It may remain a subject of genuine debate whether the Igbos, who were methodically and systematically pauperized by their victors after the war and were themselves struggling to find their feet, could have done much for Gen Effiong. But there is little doubt that certain Igbos, especially those who participated in post-war reconstruction, could have made a dent of a difference in Gen. Effiong�s life, and certainly no doubt thirty years after the war ended. What cannot be denied is that it is indeed difficult to explain that not even the chieftaincy title, which has lost value and significance in Igboland from sheer ubiquity, redundancy and trivialization, was given to General Effiong.

I believe that this observation is not unique to this writer because it was beautifully captured in Rudolph Okonkwo�s piece �LAMENTATION FOR EFFIONG� in Nigeriaworld.com of November 19, 2003 where he said in part��we did not give you titles. But we found time to give twos and threes to ourselves. We did not hold your hand and insist that you too should get a title from one of our warrant chiefs, even as we accumulate ours�. The anti-climax was, of course, when Effiong himself was asked �Have the Igbo honoured you with any title?�, and he answered, in his own words, �no, no, no, I have not been honoured by them in any way�.

However it is not too late for the Igbos to improve their image with regard to their journey with Gen. Effiong. Effiong has departed the present life, but he left his name and as the bible would say �sons and daughters�. It is certainly �too little, too late� for Igbos to name a street or a building after Gen. Effiong. A landmark in Igboland must be named after General Effiong such that when generations of unborn Igbo children will ask, who is General Philip Effiong and why is such an important landmark named after him, then his story can be told again and again. The Enugu International airport, (whenever it is ready) and the proposed second bridge across the Niger at Onitsha (again, whenever it becomes a reality) are prime candidates for the immortalization of Gen Effiong�s name in a manner that will approach a threshold commensurate to Effiong�s dedication to the Igbo cause. Anything short of these will be tantamount, in the words of an Igbo proverb, to a bird that ascended from the ground unto a termite mound. That bird is still on the ground. The naming of such a major landmark after Gen Effiong must be in addition to, and not in place of, other memorials like foundations, trusts and the like.

May the Akangkang Ibiono Ibom rest in peace and may another like him rise to take his place.

Dr. Nnaemeka Luke Aneke, a practicing physician and attorney at law, in Westbury New York, is a bible teacher and associate Pastor at Hope Restoration Pentecostal Ministries headquarters in Queens Village, New York. He is also the Vice-President of Health Care Workers for Christ (HCWC) an evangelistic organization in metropolitan New York