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Lukeaneke@aol.com Westbury, NY, USA

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OBONG (General) PHILIP EFIONG:
A TRIBUTE TO AN UNCOMMON NIGERIAN (Part 1)

etired Major General Philip Effiong, the sword of Akwa Ibom, the Akangkang Ibiono Ibom, passed away on November 6, 2003. His death made the network news and the headlines of some print media in Nigeria and also some foreign press. The reason his death made some relevant stories in the foreign press was obviously because the whole world came to know General Effiong as a result of the emotional and moving surrender statement he made on January 12, 1970 whose text was carried in full by major world newspapers like the New York Times, The Times of London and other foreign press. Those statements from Effiong effectively brought the Nigerian civil war to an end, at least the battlefield phase.

This writer believes in giving tribute to people while they are alive instead of when they are dead, but unfortunately this tribute intended for Gen. Effiong while he would be alive was suddenly overtaken by his death. I had planned to write this tribute about May/June of 2003, but when I learnt that General Effiong’s birthday is November 18, I had postponed this tribute to more appropriately coincide with his birthday, not knowing that death was lurking in the corner that would make it impossible for him to read it. The passing away of the general threw me into a period of grief, thereby delaying this tribute further.

Born on November 18, 1924, Obong (Gen.) Philip Efiong joined the Nigerian Army on 28 July 1945 at Enugu, and rose through the ranks till 1956 when he received the Queen's Commission after his officer cadet training in the United Kingdom at Eaton Hall in Chester. After serving in various parts of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Republic of Congo in 1961, Obong Efiong was transferred to the Nigerian Army Ordnance Corps from where he became the first Nigerian Commander of the Ordnance Depot in Yaba, Lagos in1962, and the first Nigerian Director of Ordnance Services of the Nigerian Army in 1963. This was the post he held as a Lieutenant Colonel when the first coup d'état took place on January 15, 1966. He was then subsequently posted to Major General Aguiyi Ironsi's Supreme Headquarters in Lagos as the first Principal Staff Officer.

In July 1966, then Lt. Col. Effiong was posted to Kaduna as Acting Brigade Commander of the 1st Brigade, Nigerian Army, a post he held till the July 29, 1966 counter coup. Having successfully escaped several attempts on his life, during the “kill all easterners” campaign in the north, he finally made it to Enugu. On the advent of the Nigerian-Biafran civil war in 1967, he subsequently took command under the Biafran secessionist military government and rose to the rank of Major General. In Biafra, as Chief of General Staff, and eventually as Officer Administering the Government of Biafra, he effectively brought the civil war to an end by signing the Instrument of Surrender in Lagos on January 15, 1970. He was married with eight children and resided in Ikot-Ekpene, Akwa Ibom State at the time of his death.

From the perspective of this writer, Gen. Effiong’s life is significant for a number of reasons, which include but are not limited to:

1. his wise and masterful handling of Biafra’s surrender.
2. his efforts in ensuring the return of Ojukwu from exile.
3. his efforts at securing the rights and privileges of former members of the Nigerian army of eastern origin.
4. his efforts to preserve the facts of the civil war from intentional and dubious adulteration and revisionism.
5. the hostile and unfriendly attitude of Nigeria’s federal government towards him, including denial of his military entitlements.
6. his determination and conviction that his civil war role was for the good of the country and therefore refusal to be intimidated by the subsequent post-war federal governments.
7. his post-war relationship with the Igbos

Gen. Effiong’s disrespectful and ignominious treatment by Nigeria’s federal government is not a secret. Many of the tributes and laments that followed in the immediate aftermath of his demise on November 6, 2003, made mention, in one way or another, of the meanness of the government towards him. In a November 15, 2003 Guardian story titled “Effiong Died In Penury, Bassey, Others Lament” , opinion leaders from the south-south chided the federal government for its neglect of Gen. Effiong.

The good news is that the Federal Government’s “teach you a lesson” attitude towards Gen. Effiong failed woefully because Effiong, for one day, never vacillated, nor regretted his role nor was intimidated by officers much inferior to him who simply happened to have been more opportuned by circumstances, to be controlling the affairs of the nation. On the contrary, Gen. Effiong held his head high and proud till his last day of pilgrimage on this planet. He repeatedly restated his faith in, and justification of the role he played during the war and how Nigeria, aware or not, benefited thereof.

Until proven otherwise, the two men responsible to ensure that Gen. Effiong received his military entitlements are President Obasanjo, as head of state and Theophilus Danjuma, as erstwhile defense minister. Nigerian military history shows that these men that saw fit to sit on Gen. Effiong’s entitlements were military neophytes to Gen. Effiong in the then Nigerian army, even though they saw nothing wrong in treating with contempt an officer so much senior to them. Obasanjo was a mere captain when Gen. Effiong was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Nigerian Army. When Effiong visited Obasanjo’s unit for inspection, Obasanjo stood at frozen attention until Effiong completed his inspection and left. Danjuma, we don’t even to talk about. But these men felt it was okay, because of an accident of power equation, to sit on the entitlements of one of their most senior officers who trained them in the rudimentary tenets of military instincts and decency.

Sincerely, though, in a military organization where Danjuma butchered his supreme commander and rose rapidly to a general, and Gowon, exploiting a most opportune ethnic sentiment, kicked out his superiors to confiscate the post of commander-in-chief, it would be foolish of this writer to express any surprise that Gen. Effiong could be treated with disrespect and contempt by products of the same organization. The real and appropriate question would be: what else do you expect when disregard for respect and seniority is the modus operandi with these men? But beyond the indiscipline and complete lack of “officer and a gentleman” tenet of the military in attempting to deny Gen. Effiong his entitlements by people he helped to polish into military candor, is the question of how much is a presidential promise worth. If Obasanjo makes you a promise today, how much reliability and confidence can you attach to such a promise, without appearing foolish?

This question becomes very necessary when considered against the background of what I believe was Gen. Effiong’s last public interview. In the Sunday Vanguard of September 21, 2003, an article titled “Apology on Biafra: Kalu goofed, says Effiong, Ex-Biafran warlord” showed Gen. Effiong’s interview with journalist, George Onah, in which Gen. Effiong chastised Abia state governor, Orji Kalu, for attempting to render any kind of apology on behalf of the Igbos for the civil war. A brief excerpt concerning Obasanjo is reproduced below:

Mr. Onah: How is life with you now and are you being currently paid pension? Gen. Effiong: My pension is not being paid yet. The president (Obasanjo) said he would take care of that particular problem. I am going to receive my pension but waiting over 30 years is quite a long time to wait for it.

From this interview, it is clear President Obasanjo promised Gen. Effiong that he would get his pension; but when? The man believed that the President would take care of it as promised, yet lamented that it took over thirty years. Now, we are no longer talking about a delay of thirty years, the reality is that the man has died without it. However, although Effiong is gone, the pertinent question still remains: if Obasanjo, with presidential executive powers, could not fulfill such a promise to one that taught him how to stand at attention and handle a rifle, can I and you depend on his promise? When history must have spoken, it is certain that Fffiong’s demise without his entitlements during Obasanjo’s eight-year reign is not good news for the president.

Let us return briefly to the other man responsible for Effiong’s entitlements. He is the immediate past defense minister, Gen. Theophilus Danjuma, who recently had blamed a “cartel” around the President for starving his ministry of funds and causing a lack of fulfillment of the things he set out to accomplish. The fact, however, is that given Danjuma’s “unparalleled respect” for military seniority, the type he showed to Fajuyi and Ironsi, who is sure that if he had funds, he would have cared to respect Effiong’s rights and pay him his entitlements. Regardless, however, it must be pointed out that Danjuma’s blame of the Presidential “cartel” for lack of performance must be taken with a grain of salt. Why? Simply, because Danjuma is fond of blaming his inexplicable situations on others.

Danjuma was briefly the subject of discussion in a recent interview of the Ikemba Nnewi, Chief Ojukwu, during the latter’s 70th birthday celebrations, in which Danjuma blamed some NCOs for the death of Ironsi. In the article titled “ I am the final Biafran truth —Ojukwu” by Paul Odili in Vanguard of Monday, November 17, 2003, the, Ikemba, in talking about a restructure of the Nigerian army said in part: “The Nigerian army has to be drastically restructured. When we were being trained, we were told that as soon as you have taken part in a coup, the entire force is disbanded, and then you build a new army whether it is a battalion, a brigade. What has happened is that in Nigeria they have tried to cover up treason”.

Then, the Ikemba continued. “What right has Theophilus Danjuma, to butcher his general officer commanding in Ibadan, what right? What right has Gowon to benefit from such a crime, what right? At this point, the interviewer, Paul Odili, interceded for Danjuma and the following brief dialogue followed:

Mr. Odili: On this Danjuma’s role there is the view that says killing Ironsi was not part of the plot, but at Ibadan the NCOs pushed him aside and then took Ironsi and killed him? Chief Ojukwu: My answer is that you are either a commander or you are not. And I loathe this situation where those who committed crime remain faceless. Is there any book where you have been told which NCOs pushed (him) aside, and he went on to benefit from that act. And would you tell me which NCO reinstated him?

It is necessary to drive home the point that whether NCOs are blamed for the death of Ironsi or “cartels” are blamed for lack of funds for the defense ministry, the facts remain that respect for seniority is not particularly Danjuma’ s business. I am indeed amused to hear people associate professionalism and respect with Danjuma in the Nigerian Army and I have since concluded that those so proposing are either ignorant of Nigerian military history or they live in the moon.

Many Nigerians may not appreciate the seriousness and implication of Gen. Effiong’s maltreatment by the Obasanjo/Danjuma beaurocracy (and the preceding military administrations), if they don’t fully realize Effiong’s seniority in the Nigerian army. General Effiong was not a contemporary of Obasanjo and Danjuma or even of Ojukwu and Gowon. Gen. Effiong joined the Nigerian Army in 1945, two years after Gen. Ironsi, and a whopping nine years before Brigadier Zaccharry Maimalari who joined the Nigeria Army in 1954. However, by 1966, Maimalari was already a Brigadier while, Effiong, nine years his senior, was still a Lieutenant Colonel, not because of any qualities or accomplishments of Maimalari that Effiong lacked other than geography, ethnicity and political connection.

But the more regrettable thing is that it appears that the same factors that affected the early days of Effiong’s tenure in the army also influenced his post-war treatment in the hands of the subsequent post-war military regimes ran by the people that he, Effiong breastfed in the army. And when this flies in the face of Gowon’s “no victor, no vanquished” declaration and a purported post-war commitment to the 3Rs (reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation) the post-war treatment of General Effiong becomes more incomprehensible.

Let us take a look at what is part of Gen. Effiong’s contributions to the country both during and after the war. People may have heard about how Gen. Effiong handled the surrender and wonder what the big deal is. But indeed, it is something that could have been disastrous if not well executed. Gen. Effiong’s handling of Biafra’s surrender is one of the most tactical and devoted maneuvers ever seen on the Nigerian scene. Those who do not appreciate the depth of it may not have appreciated what was a stake as Biafra capitulated.

First of all, no one really knew what would be the reaction of the men of the Nigeria’s third marine commandoes that fractured Biafra from the south. There were ominous signs that things may not go well for those who had to undertake the surrender and that Effiong may have accepted to handle a situation that was more dangerous than he thought, and which could indeed cost him his life. The following unanticipated situations were just part of what Gen. Effiong had to deal with:

After Biafra had collapsed, Ojukwu had departed, Effiong had announced the surrender and Biafran troops were surrendering in their thousands, the Nigerian Airforce, suffering from an obsessive compulsion to kill Biafrian civilians, were still rocketing and strafing defenseless and disillusion civilians fleeing aimlessly in different directions not knowing where to go, as unrelenting mortar and artillery barrages trailed their shadows (See New York Times, January 14, 1970, page 1, column 5).

Ojukwu, probably unknowingly, had set up a scenario that would have given cover to Federal forces to massacre the Igbos, if they wished, by insisting on several occasions in Biafra that if Biafran major towns collapsed, he would wage guerilla war from the bushes of Biafra. Threats of a guerilla warfare was repeatedly made in Biafra by the other Biafran leaders even when it was clear that the prerequisites of a successful guerilla warfare was lacking in a completely besieged Biafra bordered externally only by Cameroon which exhibited a most virulent hostility towards Biafra in return for certain promises from Gowon. The wantonness and indiscipline of the third Marine Commandoes were clearly beyond the ability of Col. Obasanjo, their division Commander to control and posed a real concern to international observers watching the vulnerability of the surrendering Biafrans. They killed at random, looted with liberty and threw gasoline molotovs at Igbo girls who did not submit to rape (See New York Times, January 24, 1970, page 13, column 1).

The fourth issue that Gen Effiong had to deal with at the surrender was relief to feed the starving and dying Biafrans. In his surrender statement on the January 12, 1970, he ended his speech with a moving appeal to the world for food to feed the easterners: “I appeal to all governments to give urgent thought to relief and to prevail on the Federal Military Government to order their troops to stop all military operations” But in a move that still puzzled psychologists, Gowon undercut Effiong’s appeal by engaging in two activities that resulted in the death of thousands of easterners who had already managed to survive the war. First, he refused relief materials from the so-called “friends of Biafra” as a punitive measure. How on earth do you punish a relief agency by refusing their relief materials? Is it the relief agency that was punished or those that went to their graves for lack of food after they had already surviv ed the war? Secondly, the relief agencies begged Gowon, since the war was already over, to allow them, at least temporarily, to flood Biafra with relief through Uli airport. But Gowon, apparently to defend his ego and show the world that he called the shots, gave a bewildering “NO” and insisted that relief be trucked from Lagos, four hundred miles away, and the North.

But where was the relief? In the immediate aftermath of war when relief was most needed, the Nigerian Red Cross was neither capable nor ready nor motivated to undertake the massive project of feeding the easterners. Numerous foreign journalists who covered Biafra’s capitulation documented the lack of manpower, vehicles and zeal resulting in numerous deaths of those who already survived the war.

What is the relevance of the lengthy foregoing? That Gen. Effiong, in his wisdom and intuition, knew that the feeding of dying Biafrans who have been starving for 3 years, a monumental task by any international standard, may be treated the Nigerian way, with levity and dereliction, and so he cried to the world to help save the situation as he ended his surrender statement. But true to form, he was proved right when those in power decided to experiment with it, in contrary to Effiong’s serious concern.

To be continued in Part II

Dr. Nnaemeka Luke Aneke, a practicing physician and attorney at law, in Westbury New York, is a bible teacher and associate Pastor at Hope Restoration Pentecostal Ministries headquarters in Queens Village, New York. He is also the Vice-President of Health Care Workers for Christ (HCWC) an evangelistic organization in metropolitan New York