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Lukeaneke@aol.com Westbury, New York

GOWON’S APOLOGY TO THE IGBOS LACKS SINCERITY

ince he retuned from exile in Britain (after he was pardoned by former President Shehu Shagari for his alleged role in the overthrow of General Murtala Mohammed), retired Gen. Yakubu Gowon has undoubtedly tried to make amends and to also be fruitful in the daily life of Nigerian governance. He has made apologies to the Igbos and others, has organized the "Nigeria Prays" movement and in late 2002, with former President Shehu Shagari, intervened in the impeachment deadlock between Obasanjo and the Federal legislature. However, it is important that as Gowon makes up for his civil war shortcomings and excesses, he avoids one important thing: trying to change the undisputed and documented facts of the war, and that brings me to the speech and apology made by Gowon to the Igbos in Asaba on or about December 09, 2002, covered by reporter Austin Ogwuda, titled "Gowon faults setting up of Oputa panel" and reproduced in Nigeriaworld.com.

In that speech, and in the course of his apology, Gowon tried to change the facts of history by claiming that he was unaware of Gen. Murtala Mohammed’s genocidal instincts and the actual genocidal campaigns he carried out west of the Niger, between Asaba and Agbor. That denial of knowledge, in the face of abundant and contrary facts, undercut Gowon’s apology and denied it of sincerity and genuineness. In that Gowon’s speech at the Asaba Township Stadium, Asaba, Gen. Gowon said in part:

"It came to me as a shock when I came to know about the unfortunate happenings that happened to the sons and daughters of this state especially of this (Asaba) domain. I felt very touched and honestly I referred to it (killings) and ask for forgiveness being the one who was in charge that time. Certainly, it is not something that I would have approved of in whatsoever. I was made ignorant of it, I think until it appeared in the papers. A young man wrote a book at that time… It just happened seven hours ago when I was visiting the state for our nation prayers, I took the opportunity of being with his Royal Majesty (Asagba of Asaba) to make this public apology on behalf of myself and government of Nigeria at that time and to ask for forgiveness as we have to look at the future. I feel very touched when we acme this time to hear his majesty refer to it again."

The problem with what otherwise would have been an excellent apology is that part of it where Gowon was implying that: one, he did not know about the genocidal campaigns at that time, two, that he did not know until it appeared in papers and a book and three, if he has known at the time he would certainly have done something to stop it. But unfortunately for General Gowon, with all due respect, the facts are not on his side.

One of the most contradictory facts to demonstrate the inaccuracy of Gowon’s assertion comes from Gowon’s own wartime Federal Information Commissioner and foremost Nigerian war propagandist during the civil war, Chief Anthony Enahoro. In the first few months of 1998, one Jumoke Ogunkeyede, head of the "United Committee to Save Nigeria" organized a kind of reconciliation meeting between Chief Anthony Enahoro and some Igbos in New Jersey, USA. In that meeting, and in answer to one of the questions posed to Chief Enahoro about his anti-Biafran role during the civil war, Chief Enahoro, who thankfully, is alive and well today, said in part:

"Do you really know anything about what happened during that war? I was the one that stopped late Gen. Murtala Mohammed from further massacre of innocent children and mothers. At a point when Britain refused to sell further arms to Nigeria because they had ample evidence from the Red Cross of the federal forces killing innocent civilians, I confronted Gowon with the fact and that the only way I can get Britain through my contact with their High Commissioner to resume a supply of weapon to Nigeria was that Murtala had to leave that war sector. Either Murtala leaves or I will have to leave his cabinet. Gowon told me that he is willing to call a meeting and on the condition I will be the one to confront Murtala. If there was anybody that Gowon feared so much it was Murtala Mohammed. At the meeting of the Federal Executive Council, I confronted Mohammed with elaborate evidence complete with photographs. He was livid. He could not refute them so he resorted to calling me all sorts of names prompting me to observe before the council that if he was a fine officer as he claims to be, he should not be acting the way he was acting. Needless to say that I was instrumental to his withdrawal from that sector and subsequent appointment as a minister". (See "The Nigerian and Africa" magazine, March 1998, page 10)

From this uncoerced and uninduced testimony of Chief Enahoro, who incidentally is still alive today, one can make the following observations:

1. That Murtala’s genocidal campaign against the Midwestern Igbos was well known and documented by the Red Cross
2. That the genocide imperiled Nigerian’s ability to secure arms supply from Britain.
3. That in attempt to maintain British arms supply to Nigeria, Chief Enahoro confronted Gowon with this reality widely documented by the Red Cross.
4. That Gowon was reluctant to confront Murtala with the allegation and indeed would not confront Murtala with it unless Enahoro would do it by himself, which he did, and
5. That it took a threat from Enahoro to Gowon "to leave his cabinet", for Gowon to eventually address the issue and remove Murtala and commander of the 2nd infantry Division.

I must say that Enahoro’s sincerity in his testimony is commendable. Enahoro admitted that his quest to stop Murtala’s murderous campaign among the Midwestern Igbos was to save the British arms supply to Nigeria and not out of sympathy or concern for the lives of those Igbos for whatever they were worth (at least not on the record). I think that Gowon should emulate this Enahoro’s sincerity and not come 34 years later to claim that he didn’t know something he abundantly knew.

Nor is Enahoro’s testimony in isolation as facts contrary to Gowon’s claim of oblivion of events in the Midwest at the time. The New York Times, on its April 5, 1968 issue, carried the following story "in relation to Murtala’s genocidal campaign in the Midwest"

Monsignor Rochcau, one of the two papal delegates representing Pope Paul VI in Nigeria, reports in Le Monde, a Paris newspaper, today that "between Benin and Asaba only widows and orphans remain, Federal troops having for unknown reasons massacred all the men".

It is common knowledge that Nigerian diplomats during the war read every major newspaper in search of "Biafran propaganda" to neutralize. I don’t know how Gowon could claim he did not know of a genocidal activity that was widely reported by the Red Cross and prominent foreign newspapers. Furthermore, it is a fact of history that the three Division Commanders that Gowon unleashed on Biafra were ruthless human beings with proven genocidal propensities: Col. Mohammed Shuwa- commander of the First Infantry Division, Col. Murtala Mohammed, commander of the 2nd Division and Col. Benjamin Adekunle, Commander of the third Marine Division. Murtala’s genocidal instincts and campaign have already been discussed above.

The military campaign of 1st Division commander, Col. Mohammed Shuwa (and Col. Theophilus Danjuma, his deputy Commander) was no less ruthless than that of Col Mohammed, even though it was less universally known. In military campaigns, it is usually assumed that more senior military officers are more restrained from unnecessary violence and that they also tend to act to restrain the lower ranks from unnecessary indiscipline and wantonness in their campaign. But regrettably, this was quite the opposite with Col. Mohammed Shuwa and his top officers that invaded Biafra from the north in July 1967. On the contrary, Col Shuwa actually mandated his troops to exercise the utmost violence on the Biafrans.

A New York Times war correspondent who visited Shuwa and Danjuma’s command headquarters in Makurdi in the last week of October 1967 found a directive dated September 16, 1967, issued as a general order (G.O.) hanging on the bulletin board. It has been issued by Col Shuwa to his troops:

"You are therefore required to push ahead ruthlessly to vanquish the rebels in your way. You will tell this to all your men because rebels have no honor and no respect for the dignity of mankind. You are bound to have heavier casualties than hitherto but you cannot win a war without heavy casualties" (See New York Times, Tuesday, October 24, 1967, p 20, Column 3)

Notice that Shuwa’s command for ruthlessness against the Biafrans (who have no honor) did not distinguish between civilians and uniformed men. And his troops carried out his instructions beyond the call of duty. As a 12-year old boy in January 1966 when the Balewa government was overthrown, there are many things I believed in Biafra, which with additional reading after the war, I have to come to discard as Biafran propaganda. But I still believe that the officers and men of the 1st division under Cols Shuwa and Danjuma were the most violent known to man (at least to me). One needed to be in Enugu in the later part of 1967 to see gouged-out eyes, amputated limbs, fractured skulls and horror stories of Nsukka refugees pouring into Enugu and environs, to appreciate the violent propensity of Shuwa, Danjuma and their men, in furtherance of Shuwa;s ruthlessness order. At my age then, I may not have known the intricate details of the cause of the war, but I certainly was old enough to recognize brutality, savagery, mayhem and wantonness when I saw one especially as practiced by Nigerian troops. Can Gowon say he didn’t know about Col Shuwa’s ruthlessness order and the atrocities that followed it, when New York Times covered it and the whole world knew? He has no way to explain it. If he knew and did nothing, of course, that’s not good for him. If he, on the other hand, as Supreme Commander, did not know that his troops carried out such atrocities and were capable of doing so, it doesn’t speak well of him either.

Now, here comes Africa’s famous Black Scorpion, Col. Benjamin Adekunle, whose genocidal instincts against Biafrans were well documented by reporters that covered the war. Addressing war correspondents at his Divisional Headquarters in the compound of Saint Michael’s Anglican Church and School in Elelewa on May 17, 1968, Col Adekunle told them with visible delight that he has besieged thousands of Biafrans inside the city of Port Harcourt "with no escape route except to jump in the water". (See New York Times, May 20, 1968, page 1, col 7). In another interview with reporters on July 14, 1968, he termed all relief plans for Biafra as "Misguided humanitarian rubbish".

In an interview with the Economist, a British magazine, reproduced in New York Times, Col Adekunle, in answer to a question about Biafran relief, proclaimed further. "I want to see no red cross, no Caritas, no World Council of Churches, no Pope, no missionary and no U.N. delegation. I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one thing to eat before their capitulation." (See Sunday New York Times Sept. 8, 1968, Sec. IV, p29). On another occasion, Col. Adekunle told the interviewer that in Biafra, "we shoot at everything that moves", and in response to another reporter’s question about how he would treat Biafrans when he gets into the "heartland of the Igbos", he replied "Then we shoot at everything, even things that don’t move." (id)

When these utterances are put together: "… no escape route except to jump in the water", "Misguided humanitarian rubbish", "I want to prevent even one Ibo having even one thing to eat…", "Then we shoot at everything, even things that don’t move." especially coming in quick succession from a Division Commander, it is no surprise that the ordinary ranks of the 3rd Division were beset with indiscipline, wantonness and violence towards Biafrans, as abundantly documented by war correspondents, missionaries and relief workers. Is Gowon implying that he did not know these well documented genocidal utterances from one of his most flamboyant and outspoken commanders during the war? To claim that will be nothing short of drawing a wool over the eyes of the Igbos, and deny his apology of sincerity and genuineness. Again, Gowon, with all due respect, might think that a smart way to escape responsibility is to feign ignorance of atrocities meted out by his troops. But indeed, rather, its smirks of naivety and aloofness for a Supreme Commander to claim ignorance of atrocities of his troops which were well documented by reporters and widely known to journalists, foreign diplomats and relief workers at that time.

On a personal note, I did not know the magnitude of the Midwestern massacre of the Igbos by Murtala’ forces until after additional reading after the end of the war. My limited knowledge came from an Asaba family with whom we shared space in a refugee camp in Uzuakoli. It will be recalled that after Murtala Mohammed’s two abysmally abortive attempts to take Onitsha from Asaba, he went up North and crossed the River Niger somewhere around Idah and then descended towards Ontisha on the Eastern bank. His "death and destruction" machine passed through my hometown in the first week of January 1968 on its way to Onitsha. Because of the unbelievable injuries visible on the refugees from Nsukka, their horror stories and the sheer rumble of Mohammed’s artillery and other hardware, everyone fled for their lives. The few people that attempted to remain were forever very sorry.

As my hometown evacuated, my mother’s uncle took us (my parents and my siblings) to Aba where we squatted in his house. Subsequently, Port Harcourt was evacuated and not too long after, artillery explosion became audible in Aba. In the course of time, all of a sudden, one evening, artillery explosions south of Aba became ground shaking in Aba. That same evening, the artillery frequency gradually increased from about one every minute to every 30 seconds to every few second to couplet, triplet and quadruplet instantaneous explosions. Luckily for us, my father, a carpenter with the Nigerian Railways, stationed at Umoba (2 or 3 train stations North of Aba) was visiting us on that day. By 2am, everybody was awake with multiple back to back unrelenting artillery bombardment. Right then, my mother’s uncle, my grandmother and my father said we must start packing immediately to leave Aba in the morning for Umoba where my father was stationed.

We arrived Umoba the next day but within 48 hours, artillery was shaking Umoba as it was in Aba two days before. My father went to the railway station at Umoba and was told that Umoba was on "evacuation standby" and that he should report for work at Umuahia for further instructions. In the midst of fear, terror and uncertainly, my father simply put all of us in a train headed north towards Umuahia with no real destination. My father didn’t want us to stay in Umuahia because of unrelenting air raid of civilians but he wasn’t sure where to keep us. In any case, that decision was made easy for him when the train grounded at Uzoakoli (2 or 3 train stations, north of Umuahia). The railway station master told my father that one of the refugee camps still had space and was still accepting people. My father, who wanted us to be in a private residence but couldn’t afford it, took us to the Anglican Primary School refugee camp near the railway station and we were registered and given space.

The refugee camp was really crowded with four families sharing each small classroom, each family to each of the four corners of the classroom. So two days after we arrived, one of the families in our classroom space moved away and an Asaba woman with three children took the spot. Her oldest daughter, 11-years old Adannia (daughter of her father) immediately struck a friendship with my 11-year old immediate younger sister and our two families became close. My father was finally posted to Umuahia.

But strangely enough, Mama Ada, as we called Adannia’s mother, would cry all night and never sleep, at least for the first few weeks. In the morning, my mother would be all over her asking why she cried all night and would never sleep, and she would say nothing. Then later, I and my younger sister pressed Adannia, her daughter, and she told us that Nigerian soldiers killed her father and her oldest brother in Asaba and forced them to watch their execution. Then we told my mother what Adannia told us, and my mother confronted Mama Ada with the story and only then did she open up. The she showed my mother her right shoulder which was a little out of joint and told my mother it was inflicted on her by the same soldiers. And my mother said, how? She said she insisted to the Nigerian troops that since she and her kids were forced to watch the execution of her crying and begging husband and son, that she must give them burials before continuing with her flight out of Asaba. It was during the struggle for the bodies of her husband and son, that they hit her on the right shoulder with the but of the gun. When she fell, they threw the bodies of her husband and son into the back of their land rover and drove away. And my mother said, "if they were heartless enough to kill your husband and son in your presence, you should not even engage them for their bodies. They could have killed you too.". And she said, "I did not know what I was doing"

I hope that Mama Ada and her children survived the war, because my family left Uzuakoli in the course of time because of relentless air raid on civilians. And up till that time, she still had not recovered from her very traumatic experience. I can only hope that after escaping the sword of Mohammed in Asaba, she did not succumb to Gowon’s unrelenting air raid of Uzuakoli. I had thought that Mama Adannia’s story and experience was an isolated incident in Asaba until I did some reading after the war and realized the scope and magnitude of General Murtala Mohammed’s genocidal campaign in Asaba.

In conclusion, I must say that I commend Gowon for bringing himself to grabble with an apology to the Igbos because, to be fair to him, apology is not a word commonly found in the dictionary of African leaders. However, having summoned the courage in the first place, he should do so without attempting to change the facts, a phenomenon that will have the opposite effect of depriving his apology of sincerity and genuineness. The facts are not broken, and they don’t need to be fixed. Also, it must be stressed that this writer has nothing personal against General Murtala Mohammed. I, like most Nigerians, admire his short-lived attempt in 1976 to reform Nigeria, albeit with ruthlessness, and I am glad for him that his name graces the busiest airport in the country. But his military excesses and overreaching are also part of his history and are needed for a balanced analysis of his legacy, especially when it is recalled that the same Murtala Mohammed and his friend, Theophilus Danjuma, oversaw the killing of over 300 Igbo army officers and men in less than 72 hours from July 29 to August 1, 1966.

Dr. Nnaemeka Luke Aneke practices Medicine and Health Law in Westbury, New York